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by Kerry A. McHugh
HE economic and financial welfare of manufacturers and sellers de-
pends upon the quality and reputation of their products. A com-
pany's quality products create and maintain the goodwill of its
customers towards the company. That goodwill generates sales revenues for
the company and often comprises a substantial portion of the company's
total value.
Statements criticizing the quality of a product, therefore, often cause pe-
cuniary losses to the manufacturer and seller of the product in the form of
lost sales and lost goodwill. Because modem media technology enables
statements to be communicated to a large number of people in a short
amount of time, statements that disparage a product have a significant effect.
In some instances, companies are forced to go out of business because con-
sumers are unwilling to purchase their products based on reports that the
products are defective or of low quality.
When disparaging statements about a company's product are false, the
company may seek to recover for the pecuniary losses it sustained as a result
of the false disparagement. Many jurisdictions grant a cause of action to
manufacturers and sellers who suffer financial or economic injuries because
of others' false disparagement of their products. Plaintiffs often bring these
actions as product disparagement or trade libel claims.
This Comment analyzes the issue of product disparagement liability under
Texas law. Section I of this Comment outlines the historical development of
product disparagement and notes the differences between disparagement and
defamation actions. With this explanation of the law of product disparage-
ment as a background, section II discusses the current state of the law in
Texas and addresses the question of whether Texas recognizes a cause of
action for product disparagement. Finally, section III presents recommen-
dations to the Texas Supreme Court for the expansion and clarification of
product disparagement law.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT
A. Disparagement Contrasted with Defamation
Product disparagement is a tort within the class of "injurious falsehood."'
1. Sir John Salmond coined the term "injurious falsehood." W. Prosser & W. KEETON
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Injurious falsehood includes actions for slander of title,2 business or com-
mercial disparagement, 3 disparagement of goods or property,4 disparage-
ment of the quality of goods or property, 5 and trade libel. 6
Actions for product disparagement differ from actions for defamation.
Although both torts provide a remedy for injuries sustained as a result of the
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 128, at 964 (W. Keeton ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]
(citing J. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS § 151 (10th ed. 1945)).
2. A slander of title action arises when someone makes malicious or damaging oral or
written statements regarding the plaintiff's title to, or interest in, real or personal property and
thereby causes the plaintiff to be unable to sell or lease the property. Prosser, Injurious False-
hood: The Basis of Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 425-26 (1939) [hereinafter Prosser,
Injurious Falsehood] (discussing development of disparagement of title or interest); see also
Hibschman, Defamation or Disparagement?, 24 MINN. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (1940) (comparing
slander of title to property disparagement). Early slander of title actions usually involved a
defendant's statement that the plaintiff did not hold legal title to the land he offered for sale.
Kendall v. Stone, 5 N.Y. 14, 18 (1851). See generally G. BOWER, Actionable Defamation 209
n. I (2d ed. 1923) (discussing origin of slander of title); Smith, Disparagement of Property, (pts 1
& 2), 13 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 121 (1913) (discussing development of disparagement of title or
interest). Although termed a "slander," the action for slander of title was not a defamation
tort, but an action on the case. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood, supra, at 425. An action on the
case differed at common law from an action for trespass. A trespass action could be against
the defendant whose wrongful acts caused direct and immediate damage to the plaintiff's prop-
erty. An action on the case, however, provided a remedy to the plaintiff who suffered property
injuries indirectly and consequentially because of the defendant's acts. See Scott v. Shepherd,
96 Eng. Rep. 525 (Com. Pl. 1773).
The association of injurious falsehood with defamation and slander, however, has affected
the development of injurious falsehood actions. Prosser, Injurious Falsehood, supra, at 427.
"[A]n aura of slander has hung over it [injurious falsehood] like a fog, obscuring its real char-
acter; and this has had far too much influence upon its development. The plaintiff's title, or
property, has come to be regarded as somehow personified, and so defamed." Id.
3. Business or commercial disparagement usually involves a defendant's statement re-
garding the plaintiff's business itself as distinct from the plaintiff's products and from the
plaintiff, who is the owner of the business. Hibschman, supra note 2, at 628-31. Business
disparagement should not be confused with libel of a corporation. The former is a form of
injurious falsehood, while the latter is a defamation action brought by a corporate "person" as
the owner of the business. See Note, Libel and The Corporate Plaintiff, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
1496, 1498-1500 (1969). A corporate entity lacks a personal reputation so that statements will
not personally defame the entity, but statements about the entity's business may be defama-
tory. Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir.
1967) (applying Florida law since publication occurred in that state); Martin v. Reynolds Met-
als Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 982-83 (D. Ore. 1963); Life Printing & Publishing Co. v. Field, 324
Ill. App. 254, 58 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1944); Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l
Union v. Zurzolo, 142 Ind. App. 242, 233 N.E.2d 784, 790-91 (1968); Axton Fisher Tobacco
Co. v. Evening Post Co., 169 Ky. 64, 77, 183 S.W. 269, 274 (1916); see Note, Corporate Defa-
mation and Product Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 963, 964-67 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Corporate Defamation].
4. The tort of disparagement of goods or property developed from the tort of slander of
title. Hibschman, supra note 2, at 628; Wham, Disparagement of Property, 211 ILL. L. REV.
26, 26-27 (1926).
5. Actions for disparagement of the quality of goods or property are within the tort of
product disparagement. Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543,
547-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 254-56 (1985).
6. Many cases use trade libel to refer to product disparagement. Like slander of title,
trade libel is a form of disparagement rather than of defamation, despite the inclusion of the
terms "libel" and "slander" in their names. Id. at 547-49, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 254-56; Albertini
v. Schaefer, 97 Cal. App. 3d 822, 826, 159 Cal. Rptr. 98, 100 (1979); Erlich v. Etner, 224 Cal.
App. 2d 69, 73, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258-59 (1964); Shores v. Chip Steak Co., 130 Cal. App. 2d
627, 630, 279 P.2d 595, 597 (1955).
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publication of false statements, each tort protects a different interest. 7 Defa-
mation actions lie only when the false statements injure the personal reputa-
tion of the plaintiff.8 Disparagement actions, however, arise whenever such
statements harm the business interests of the plaintiff and result in pecuniary
losses. 9
Although disparagement and defamation constitute distinct torts, 10 many
cases involve statements that disparage a plaintiff's property or product and
also defame the plaintiff's character or reputation." Accordingly, if the
statement indicates that the plaintiff is dishonest or lacks integrity, 12 is in-
7. Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 408-09 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Polygram
Records, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441
Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971); Hibschman, supra note 2, at 633-34; Prosser, Injurious
Falsehood, supra note 2, at 427; see Wham, supra note 4, at 27-29; Note, The Law of Commer-
cial Disparagement: Business Defamation's Impotent Ally, 63 YALE L.J. 65, 74-75 (1953); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A comment g (1977) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT] (the tort of defamation protects personal reputations while the tort of disparagement
protects economic interests only).
8. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinal Publishing Co., 104 N.J, 125, 516 A.2d 220, 224 (1986).
The elements of a cause of action for defamation include "(a) a false and defamatory statement
concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at
least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." RE-
STATEMENT § 558, at 155. A statement "is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him." Id. § 559, at 156; see Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 224.
Actionable defamation requires personal injury to the reputation of another person. PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 111, at 773-74. A plaintiff in a defamation action may, how-
ever, recover damages for pecuniary loss resulting from injury to his personal reputation. Id.
§ 116A, at 844. Defamatory statements tend "to injure 'reputation' in the popular sense; to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." Id. at 773. Defamation
involves the concept of disgrace. Id. A defendant who defames another and thereby injures
not only the personal reputation, but also the economic interests of another is liable for pecuni-
ary loss resulting to the other if "(a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in
harm to interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recog-
nize that it is likely to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless of
its truth or falsity." RESTATEMENT § 623A, at 334; see Hibschman, supra note 2, at 628-34.
For a discussion of the special damages requirement and of losses recoverable in disparage-
ment actions, see infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
9. For a list of the elements of product disparagement, see text accompanying infra note
37. Disparagement and other injurious falsehoods are forms of tortious interference with eco-
nomic relations. Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 224; Green, Relational Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1,
37-43 (1935). See generally 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GREY, LAW OF TORTS § 6.1 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing product disparagement as offshoot of cause of action for interference.with
contractual relations). Product disparagement is a form of unfair interference with economic
relations in which the defamation of the plaintiff is merely incidental to the disparagement of
his product. Royer v. Stoody Co., 192 F. Supp. 949, 951-54 (W.D. Okla. 1961).
10. Menefee v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 458 Pa. 46, 52-53, 329 A.2d 216, 219-20
(1974). Compare supra note 8 (setting forth elements of defamation) with infra text accompa-
nying note 37 (listing elements of disparagement).
11. Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 224 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128, at
964-65). A statement that disparages a plaintiff's product may also imply defamation of the
plaintiff manufacturer or owner of the business. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128, at
964-65.
12. Statements that indicate that the plaintiff is dishonest or that he lacks integrity give
rise to a cause of action for defamation rather than for disparagement. Steaks Unlimited, Inc.
v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 270-71 (3d Cir. 1980); Erlich v. Enter, 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 36
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competent,13 is fraudulent or deceitful, 14 or has any other reprehensible
characteristic,15 the plaintiff has a cause of action for defamation.16
Larsen v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle represents one of the earliest important
cases involving defamation by product disparagement.17 In Larsen a news-
paper article alleged that ice cream manufactured by Larsen contained
harmful ingredients. The article stated that the ice cream caused the death
of one child and severe illness in four other children. The New York Court
of Appeals acknowledged that the harmful ingredients could have contami-
nated the ice cream as a result of a single accident without the manufac-
turer's knowledge or evil intent.18 According to the court, however, readers
of the article might infer that the manufacturer was dishonest and deceitful
because the contamination of the ice cream caused injuries to numerous chil-
dren. 19 The court ruled, therefore, that the statements were defamatory
with respect to Larsen personally. 20
Statements that do not impute to the plaintiff a lack of honesty or integ-
rity, in contrast, do not constitute actionable defamation. General Market
Co. v. Post-Intelligencer Co. ,21 another significant early case, involved an ar-
ticle asserting that the Washington State Department of Agriculture de-
Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (1964); Larsen v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 165 A.D. 4, 150 N.Y.S. 464, 465
(1914).
13. Statements implying that the plaintiff lacks skill or compentence in his trade or busi-
ness are defamatory of the plaintiff. Holland v. Flick, 212 Pa. 201, 61 A. 828, 829 (1905).
14. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1983)
(citing Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co., 345 F.2d 395, 397 (7th Cir. 1965));
Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 271 (3d Cir. 1980); see supra note 12.
15. Statements that impute criminal conduct to the plaintiff constitute actionable defama-
tion. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684, 695 (D.N.J. 1985); Molnar v.
Star-Ledger, 193 N.J. Super. 12, 17-18, 471 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984);
Pfeifely v. Henry, 269 Pa. 533, 112 A. 768, 769 (1921).
16. Polygram Records v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252,
256 (1985); accord Steaks Unlimited, 623 F. Supp. at 271; National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas
Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 1927); Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen
Salsbery Laboratories, 17 F.2d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1926); Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 224; Erlich
v. Enter, 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (1964); Harwood Pharmacal Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 603-04, 214 N.Y. S.2d 725, 727-28
(1961); White v. Hanks, 255 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Ky. 1953); Larsen v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 165
A.D. 4, 150 N.Y.S. 464, 465-66 (1914). In theory, the plaintiff may sue and recover for both
product disparagement and personal defamation. Kollenberg v. Ramirez, 127 Mich. App.
345, 339 N.W.2d 176, 178-79 (1983). If damages are duplicated, however, the plaintiff may
not recover for both torts. 339 N.W.2d at 179; see Georgia Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons v. Ander-
son, 257 Ga. 710, 363 S.E.2d 140, 143-44 (1987) (declining to determine whether Georgia
recognizes actions for trade libel, but holding that damages awarded for trade libel or personal
defamation would constitute impermissible double recovery when plaintiffs also recovered for
unfair trade practices). Thus, when a court finds that a statement disparaged the plaintiff's
product and also personally defamed the plaintiff, it will proceed on the defamation theory
alone because the plaintiff may recover for economic injury as well as for emotional suffering
under the defamation action. See supra note 8. Moreover, the defamation action requires the
plaintiff to make fewer showings than does a disparagement claim. See supra note 8 and text
accompanying infra note 37 and accompanying text.
17. 150 N.Y.S. 464 (1914).
18. Id. at 466.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 466-67.
21. 96 Wash. 575, 165 P. 482 (1917).
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stroyed General Market's food products because they were unfit for
consumption. The Washington Supreme Court held that the article was not
libel per se, despite the fact that the article specifically named General Mar-
ket in both the headline and the text.22
In a similar case, which involved disparagement of the quality of a ca-
terer's food, a Massachusetts court held that statements criticizing the food,
cigars, and wine that a caterer served at a dinner were not defamatory of the
caterer, but merely disparaged the dinner it served.23 Marlin Firearms Co. v.
Shields24 also involved disparagement of the quality of another's goods. In
Marlin Shield's magazine published sham letters that it purported to have
received from its readers, criticizing Marlin guns.25 The Court of Appeals of
New York held that the letters did not defamate Marlin but merely dispar-
aged the guns themselves. 26 The court stated that words disparaging a prod-
uct are not defamatory as to the manufacturer unless they imply that the
manufacturer is guilty of deceit in manufacturing or selling the product. 27
If, however, disparaging statements regarding a product directly attack the
honesty, integrity, or capability of the manufacturer, the statements consti-
tute libel of the manufacturer. 28
In Polygram Records v. Superior Court 29 a California appeals court thor-
oughly reviewed the laws of disparagement and defamation in California. 30
The Polygram case involved a joke told by a comedian during a live perform-
ance and on audio and video tapes. David Rege, owner of Rege Wine Cel-
lars, filed suit against the comedian, alleging that the joke referred to Rege
personally and to Rege brand wines. After an extended discussion of the
nature of comedy and parody,3' the Polygram court rejected Rege's theory
that the joke personally defamed him and disparaged his products by associ-
ating them with blacks. 32 The court stated that to permit recovery in such a
case would be repugnant to constitutional values that prohibit racial dis-
crimination. 33 Furthermore, the court stated that the joke was impossible
for any sensible person to take seriously.34
22. 165 P. at 483-84.
23. Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E. 809, 811 (1887). The
article stated that the caterer served "a wretched dinner.., in such a way that even hungry
barbarians might justly object." 10 N.E. at 809.
24. 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
25. The letters specifically asserted that Marlin rifles had defective extractors and ejectors.
One letter contained a paragraph allegedly excerpted from the catalogue of a reputable gun
dealer stating that the dealer refused to recommend or guaranty Marlin rifles. The excerpt
further asserted that the dealer would not accept liability if the Marlin rifles "chew[ed] up the
heads of cartridges" or "clog[ged] up." 64 N.E. at 163.
26. Id. at 164.
27. Id. (citing Tobias v. Harland, 4. Wend. 537 (1862)).
28. Id.
29. 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985).
30. Id. at 548-55, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 254-60.
31. Id at 551-55, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 257-60.
32. Id. at 557-58, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62.
33. Id
34. Id. at 556-57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61; see, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 695
F.2d 438, 443 (1985) (no reasonable reader could reasonably believe statements in sexual-
humor article); Yorty v. Chandler, 13 Cal. App. 3d 467, 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1970)
1988] 1207
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As this discussion indicates, courts addressing product disparagement and
defamation causes of action tend to approach the issues on a case-by-case
basis. Consequently, the decisions within and among certain jurisdictions
diverge in rationale and result.35 Similar facts and circumstances often have
produced dissimilar results.36 Because courts find it difficult to determine
whether a particular statement gives rise to a cause of action for defamation
or for disparagement, their decisions have failed to provide future courts
with a clear guideline for making the same distinction.
B. Elements of a Cause of Action for Product Disparagement
The elements of a cause of action for product disparagement include:
(1) the publication of matter derogatory to the plaintiff's product or the
quality of the product, (2) falsity of the publication or statement, (3) malice,
or intent to prevent others from dealing with the plaintiff or from purchasing
its products or otherwise to interfere with the plaintiff's relations with others
to its disadvantage, and (4) special damages in the form of pecuniary loss. 37
The first element of a cause of action for product disparagement involves
several distinct showings. First, the plaintiff must prove publication or com-
munication of the statement to a third person.38 Second, the plaintiff must
(political cartoon could not be deemed defamatory as serious statement of fact); Blake v.
Hearst Publications Inc., 85 Cal. App. 2d 6, 11, 170 P.2d 100, 103 (1946) (cartoon "extremely
distasteful" to plaintiff held not defamatory). The Polygram court implied that the facts failed
to indicate that the allegedly defamatory and disparaging statements could be understood to
refer to Rege and Rege wine. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 556-57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61.
A plaintiff in either a defamation action or a disparagement action must show that the state-
ment referred to him or his product, respectively. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of this requirement with respect to fictitious characters, see infra note
42.
35. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 548-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55. Compare Larsen v.
Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 150 N.Y.S. 464 (1914) (statements that ice cream contained harmful
ingredients defamatory of manufacturer) and Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264,
271 (article reporting plaintiff's meat was low quality, commercial grade steak defamed meat
packer) with General Market Co. v. Post-Intelligencer Co., 96 Wash. 575, 165 P. 482 (1917)
(report that agriculture department destroyed plaintiff's food product because it was inedible
did not defame plaintiff) and Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 437,
334 N.Y.S.2d 325, 329-30 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (food and service review on plaintiff's restaurant
and other similar restaurants describing food as "mostly all fake food, ground up schmutz" did
not defame plaintiff).
36. See infra note 35.
37. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 346, 351 (9th Cir.
1988) (citing Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 548-49, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 255); Zerpol Corp. v.
DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT § 623A); General
Prod. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546, 553 (E.D. Va. 1981); Menefee v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 458 Pa. 46, 53, 329 A.2d 216, 220-21 (1974); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 128, at 967-70.
38. Zerpol, 561 F. Supp. at 509. Because an action for product disparagement is analo-
gous to an action for interference with commercial relations, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 1, § 128, at 964, see Green, supra note 9, at 37; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128,
at 964, and requires an allegation and proof of special damages, see infra notes 50-60 and
accompanying text, the action necessarily requires the publication or communication of state-
ment to a third person. Defamation encompasses the torts of libel and slander. Western Com-
merce Bank v. Reliance Ins. Co., 105 N.M. 346, 732 P.2d 873, 875 (1987); see PROSSER &
Keeton, supra note 1, § 112, at 785. Libel is written defamation, whereas slander is oral defa-
mation. Western Commerce Bank, 732 P.2d at 875. The distinction between oral and written
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show that the statement was disparaging in nature. 39 Statements giving rise
to a cause of action may either explicitly or implicitly disparage a plaintiff's
product.4° Finally, the plaintiff must establish that the disparaging publica-
tion actually referred to the plaintiff's product.41 The test is whether third
parties understood the statements to refer to the plaintiff's product.42
statements, however, does not carry over into the law of disparagement. Polygram, 170 Cal.
App. 3d 643, 649, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1985). A communication need not be in writing to
support a valid claim for product disparagement. Id.
39. Compare Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437-38 (5th
Cir. 1962) (though not analyzed in terms of product disparagement, slogan used by manufac-
turer of floor wax containing insecticide, "Where there's life ... there's bugs," held to deceive
public to detriment of Anheuser-Busch and its beer advertisement slogan, "Where there's life
... there's Bud,") with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 35, 40 (N.D. Ohio
1984) (florists' use of slogan, "This Bud's For You," to promote "something as wholesome,
delectable, and appetizing as a dewy rosebud" held not to disparage Anheuser-Busch's slogan
or its product, Budweiser beer). See Note, supra note 7, at 77.
40. Compare Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsberg Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d
255, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1926) (defendant explicitly stated that Bowman's animal medicine was
composed only of brown sugar and bran and that state was taking action against Bowman)
with Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Publishing Co., 245 Mass. 262, 139 N.E. 655, 656
(1923) (Sun-American published editorials stating that Lawrence Trust's business and
creditworthiness were failing and implied that its officers were untrustworthy) and Pendleton
v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188, 89 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1940) (Life magazine's false assertion that
portrait it published was first ever painted of Harry S. Truman impliedly disparaged genuine-
ness of first portrait). The jury may infer that a statement is derogatory in nature. See Note,
supra note 7, at 77-78.
41. See National Ref. Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 1927);
Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856, 863 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Zerpol,
561 F. Supp. at 409; Mario's Enterprises, Inc. v. Morton-Norwich Prod., Inc., 487 F. Supp.
1308, 1311-12 (W.D. Ky. 1980).
In Mario's the operator of a chain of restaurants sued a pharmaceutical manufacturer for
defamation and product disparagement. Mario's claims arose from a television advertisement
in which an actor who was portraying a firefighter said that he was unsure whether a "two-
alarm fire, or Mario's 3-alarm meatballs" had caused his "4-alarm case of In-di-ges-tion." 487
F. Supp. at 1311. Morton-Norwich argued that the "Mario" in the commercial referred to the
firehouse cook who was visible in the background of the scene. Id. The court held that no
reasonable viewer would understand the advertisement to refer to restaurants owned by the
plaintiff or to the meatballs served in those restaurants. Id. at 1311-12.
See also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1983). In
Jacobson a television broadcast criticized Brown & Williamson for encouraging children to
smoke by associating smoking with drinking, sex, marijuana, and other illicit pleasures. The
Seventh Circuit held that although Brown & Williamson may have stated a claim for defama-
tion, the facts did not give rise to an action for product disparagement because the broadcast
did not suggest that Brown & William's cigarettes were of lesser quality or any more unhealthy
than other cigarettes. Id. at 274.
42. Zerpol, 561 F. Supp. at 410; see National Refining, 20 F.2d at 766-67; Mario's, 487 F.
Supp. at 1311-12; Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 437, 334 N.Y.
S.2d 325, 329-30 (Sup. Ct. 1972). For an application of this test to libel cases, see Zelik v.
Daily News Publishing Co., 288 Pa. Super. 277, 431 A.2d 1046, 1049 (1981); Farrell v. Trian-
gle Publications, Inc., 399 Pa. 102, 106, 159 A.2d 734, 737 (1960); Grove v. Morgan, 576 P.2d
1155, 1156-57 (Okla. 1978); Faucett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 50 (Okla. 1962).
A jury may infer reference to the plaintiff's product, just as it may infer that the statement was
disparaging in nature. National Refining, 20 F.2d at 767; see Note, supra note 7, at 77.
Zerpol involved the question of whether statements disparing the product of a fictitious
character could be actionable. 561 F. Supp. at 407. In that case, a manufacturer and seller of
pollution control systems brought suit against a competitor on theories of product disparage-
ment, unfair competition, tortious interference with economic relationships, and antitrust. 561
F. Supp. at 407-08. DMP's advertisements depicted a fictitious character called Sid and his
fictitious business, Sid's Waste Water Treatment Emporium. Id. at 406-07. The advertise-
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The second element of the cause of action for product disparagement is
falsity.4 3 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant's state-
ment is false.44 Plaintiffs in product disparagement cases may have difficulty
establishing the falsity of statements when the statements reflect subjective
opinions rather than objective facts.45 Furthermore, first amendment guar-
antees of free speech and press may protect many statements of opinion.46
To satisfy the third element of a cause of action for product disparage-
ment, the plaintiff must show malice,47 or an intent to prevent third parties
from doing business with the plaintiff or otherwise to interfere in the plain-
tiff's economic relations with others. A product disparagement plaintiff may
establish the malice or intent element by showing that the defendant knew
its statement was false and that the defendant knew the statement would
disparage the plaintiff's products. 48 Courts generally allow proof of a de-
fendant's reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement to satisfy
the requirement of knowledge or intent.49
ments disparaged Sid's pollution control system, the "Z-RO-TEC" system by stating that Sid
specialized in zero technology engineering. Id. at 407. The advertisements also impugned
Sid's understanding of EPA regulations as well as his general knowledge of waste water treat-
ment. See id. at 406-08, 410. The court, therefore, construed Zerpol's complaint as a claim for
defamation because DMP's statements attacked Sid's technical abilities and would arguably
discourage others from contracting for his services. Id. at 410. DMP asserted that the state-
ments did not constitute actionable disparagement or defamation because they did not specifi-
cally refer to Zerpol or its product. Id. The Zerpol court stated that a plaintiff may recover for
injury resulting from publication about a fictitious person. Id. at 411 (citing Geiser v. Pe-
trocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980)); Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651
(2d Cir. 1966); Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951); see
also RESTATEMENT § 564 comment d (real person may recover for libelous statements dealing
with fictitious character if character bears such resemblance to real person as to make it rea-
sonable for others to understand that character intended to portray that real person). The
Zerpol court held, however, that third parties could not reasonably understand DMP's adver-
tisements to refer to Zerpol or its products. 561 F. Supp. at 414-15. The court, therefore,
dismissed the disparagement and defamation claims. Id. at 415.
43. Bunch v. Artec Int'l Corp., 559 F. Supp. 961, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Zerpol, 561 F.
Supp. at 409; Polygram, 70 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Beecher v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 267 Or. 496, 501, 517 P.2d 667, 670 (1973).
44. The law of defamation differs from disparagement with respect to the falsity element.
In defamation actions, falsity is presumed and the defendant has the burden of proving truth as
a defense. See Note, supra note 7, at 75-76; see also RESTATEMENT § 651(l)(c) (setting forth
burden of proof on issue of falsity in product disparagement and other injurious falsehood
actions).
45. See Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier, 263 N.Y. 386, 399, 189 N.E. 463, 469
(1934); Note, The Fact Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need For a
Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1820-54 (1984); Note, supra note 7, at 75-76.
46. Bose Corp. v Consumers Unions of U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189, 193-94 (1st Cir. 1982)
("there is no such thing as a false idea"); see infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
47. Bose, 692 F.2d at 193-94. According to the Bose court, a public figure in a product
disparagement case must prove actual malice. Id. at 195 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964)); see infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note
7, at 78-84.
48. Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 228-29 (citing series of decisions from many jurisdictions
applying actual malice standard to product disparagement claims); see Note, supra note 7, at
78.
49. 692 F.2d at 192-94; see RESTATEMENT § 623A comment d; see also RESTATEMENT
§ 580A comment d (discussing element of intent with respect to actions for defamation). But
see Waste Distillation Technology, Inc. v. Blaseland & Bouck Engineers, P.C., 523 N.Y.S.2d
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Finally, a plaintiff who asserts a product disparagement claim must allege
and prove special damages.50 The plaintiff may satisfy the special damages
requirement only by showing a liquidated or actually realized pecuniary
loss. 5 1 General, implied, or presumed damages fail to support a claim for
product disparagement. 52 A plaintiff may, however, recover for clear pecu-
niary losses.53 As part of these pecuniary losses, the plaintiff may recover
the cost of litigation incurred in a reasonable effort to vindicate the product's
quality. 54 The plaintiff also may recover for loss due to the impaired mar-
ketability of the product.55 The product disparagement plaintiff must sub-
stantiate such loss, however, by evidence of lost sales. 56 To prove lost sales,
the plaintiff ordinarily must identify specific lost sales, rather than testify to
a general decrease in sales volume.5 7 Specifically, the plaintiff must present
the names of all lost customers and show a causal relationship between the
defendant's statements and the plaintiff's lost sales.5 8 The traditional ration-
ale for the special damages requirement was that if a merchant suffered ac-
575, 577 (App. Div. 1988) (negligence standard applied to element of intent to disparage under
state libel statute).
50. Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Snasbury Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 261
(8th Cir. 1926); see Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 237; Stiffel Co. v. Westwood Lighting Group, 658
F. Supp. 1103, 1115 (D.N.J. 1983); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1253-
54 (D. Ariz. 1981); Testing Sys. Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286, 290-91 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Marlin, 64 N.E. at 164-65; Dooling v. Budget Publishing Co., 144 Mass. 258, 10 N.E.
809, 811 (1887). But see Hollymatic Corp. v. Holly Sys., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (citing Big O'Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219,
1235 (D. Colo. 1976)) (as matter of policy there is no reason to require special damages in
business disparagement case), modified, 451 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1052 (1978); Royer v. Stoody, 192 F. Supp. 949, 953 (W.D. Okla. 1961) (trend is to do away
with necessity of alleging special damages). Compare Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402
F.2d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 1968) (no special damages need be alleged or proved if complaint of
disparagement based on unfair competition and not libel) (citing Wiegand Co. v. Trent Co.,
122 F.2d 920, 924 (3d Cir. 1941) (special damages not necessary element of claims for unfair
competition), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1942).
51. Marlin, 64 N.E. at 164-65; see Erik Bowman, 17 F.2d at 261; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 128.
52. Marlin, 64 N.E. at 164-65; see Erik Bowman, 17 F.2d at 261 (plaintiff must allege loss
of certain customers by name and facts showing that false publication directly caused special
damages); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128.
53. See Note, supra note 7, at 91.
54. Zerpol, 561 F. Supp. at 409; see Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 570 F.
Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Rayl v. Skull Enter., Inc., 108 Idaho 524, 700 P.2d 567,
572-73 (1984) (attorneys fees incurred in removing false lien from title of property recoverable
in slander of title action); Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 655 P.2d 513, 515 (Nev. 1983) (attor-
neys' fees recoverable in slander of title action; citing Michigan, Montana, New Mexico and
Utah as jurisdictions conforming to this rule).
55. Erik Bowman, 17 F.2d at 261.
56. Id.
57. See Erlich v. Enter, 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 72, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (1964) (general
decrease in sales and name of one lost customer insufficient to recover special damages); Note,
Trade Libel and Its Special Damage Requirement, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 394 (1965). A plaintiff
may rely on a substantial amount of general lost sales over a sustained period naturally and
probably resulting from a disparaging publication if the plaintiff is unable to allege the names
of particular lost customers. Erik Bowman, 17 F.2d at 261; see supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text.
58. Erik Bowman, 17 F.2d at 260-62; Fairyland, 413 F. Supp. at 1292-93; Erlich, 224 Cal.
App. at 72, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 258; see Note, supra 57, at 394. For a discussion of the special
damage requirement set forth in Erik Bowman and Fairyland, see supra notes 50 and 57.
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tual damages, it would have no difficulty showing specific lost sales.59
Today, however, proving special damages is a burdensome task.60
C. Case Law Development of Product Disparagement Actions
Plaintiffs file product disparagement actions in a variety of factual circum-
stances. Product disparagement plaintiffs often claim that statements made
by competitors falsely disparaged the plaintiffs' products. The allegedly dis-
paraging statements frequently appear in competitors' advertisements. In
other instances, however, product disparagement complainants may allege
that noncompetitors' statements referring to the plaintiffs' products consti-
tute actionable disparagement. Defendant noncompetitors may be dissatis-
fied customers, consumer interest groups, trade journal publishers, or
members of the news media. Historically, courts have distinguished between
statements made by competitors and those made by noncompetitors.
6t
1. Noncompetitors
One recent case involving product disparagement by a noncompetitor is
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinal Publishing Co. 62 In Dairy Stores Sentinal's
newspaper published a series of articles focusing on the water shortage in
Milltown, New Jersey, and the consequent increase in sales of bottled water
at Dairy Stores' Milltown convenience store. When Dairy Stores refused to
reveal the source of its bottled "spring water," a reporter took a sample of
the water to certain testing laboratories to determine the composition of the
spring water. In a subsequent article the reporter disclosed the laboratories'
test results, which indicated that Diary Stores' bottled water contained chlo-
rine and, therefore, could not be real spring water.
The majority of the Dairy Stores court acknowledged that the facts gave
rise to a cause of action for product disparagement. Deferring to the charac-
terization of the claim adopted by the parties and the lower court, however,
the majority decided the case as a defamation action. 63 A significant concur-
59. Wilson v. Dubois, 35 Minn. 471, 29 N.W. 68 (1886); see Note, supra note 57, at 395.
60. Modern retail markets are larger and more complex. Sales transactions, therefore, are
not personal exchanges. Large manufacturers do not even deal directly with the ultimate con-
sumers of their products. In fact, many retailers and other businesses do not know the custom-
ers with whom they do transact business in person. These factors have made the special
damages element extremely difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy in many cases. See Zerpol,
561 F. Supp. at 409; Note, supra note 57, at 395. Financial experts are unable, however, to
make accurate predictions of future lost sales. Accurate lost sales projections may resolve the
problem of uncertain or unascertainable damages and thereby virtually eliminate the need for a
showing of specific lost sales and customers. See id. at 395.
61. Smith, supra note 2, at 141-42; see Comment, The First Amendment and the Basis of
Liability in Actions for Corporate Libel and Product Disparagement, 27 EMORY L.J. 755, 760-
61 (1978).
62. 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220 (1986).
63. 516 A.2d at 224. The majority reasoned that although the article disparaged Dairy
Stores' bottled water, it also defamed Dairy Stores as an entity by implying that the corpora-
tion attempted to deceive the public by refusing to disclose the source of its water and by
fraudulently representing its water as spring water. Id. at 225. For a discussion of the distinc-
tion between defamation and disparagement drawn by the Dairy Stores court, see supra notes
8-9 and accompanying text.
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ring opinion argued that the claim should have been decided as a product
disparagement action.64
2. Competitors
As a general rule, no action for product disparagement arises when a com-
petitor or trade rival favorably compares its own products or goods to those
of another.65 Despite the fact that product comparisons impliedly disparage
competitors' products, courts refuse to recognize an action if a competitor
merely states that its products are better than all others, 66 that its products
are better than those of a specified person,67 or that its products are better in
some certain way than those of another. 68 The rationale of this general rule
is that the public regularly regards seller's talk69 to be untrustworthy and,
therefore, does not rely upon it.70 This rationale assumes that because sales
hype does not dissuade potential customers from purchasing the product of
the advertiser's competitor, the competitor suffers no injury.71 Statements
64. 516 A.2d at 237-38 (Girbaldi, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (consum-
ers naturally wary of competitors' claims); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym'
Recreational and Athletic Equip. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (public
expects competitors to claim that their products are better than others), vacated on other
grounds, 546 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1976); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., 242 F.
Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (sellers in competitive market have privilege to puff statements
about their products); see Smith, supra note 2, at 133; see also Handler, Unfair Competition, 21
IOWA L. REV. 175, 197 (1986); Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47
YALE L.J. 1304 (1938).
Federal statutes govern certain instances of unfair deceptive competition and of trade-mark
violations. See infra note 83 (setting forth pertinent provisions of section 5 of Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)); note 108 (setting forth provisions of
section 43(a) of Lanham Trade-mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982)); text accompanying
notes 83-123 (discussing potential private actions under those statutes).
66. See Smith, supra note 2, at 33.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 134. Competitors in the market place are "expected to sing a little of the tune
'Anything Theirs Can Do, Ours Can Do Better.'" Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American
Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1063, 1073 (W.D. Pa. 1975), va-
cated on other grounds, 546 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 566 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1979).
Another rationale for the rule that mere comparison does not constitute actionable dispar-
agement is that diluting the puffing privilege would have an anti-competitive effect. Sims v.
Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing FTC Policy Statement on
Comparative Advertising, 48 U.S.L.W. 2136 (Aug. 13, 1979)). For a discussion of statutory
remedies for product disparagement under the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), see infra text accompanying notes 83-106.
70. The rule is grounded in the common sense notion that purchasers will take such com-
parisons with a grain of salt. Sims, 488 F. Supp. at 605.
71. Id.; see, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. DuBois Brewing Co., 175 F.2d 370, 372-76 (3d
Cir. 1940) ("original" and "comparable in quality" are mere comparative advertising or
seller's puffing); Lewyt Corp. v. Health-Mar, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 189, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1949) ("New
and Revolutionary" held not actionable), rev'd, 181 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1950); see also White v.
Mellin, 1895 App. Cas. 154, 165 (suggests that recognizing such actions would force courts to
adjudicate question of which product was better). But see Note, supra note 7, at 46 n.59 (ques-
tioning validity of this rationale in light of important role advertising plays in modern society).
RESTATEMENT § 646A follows the rule that a competitor's puffing statements in its adver-
tisements are not actionable. The Restatement, however, justifies the rule in terms of the com-
petitor's privilege and thereby sets forth a defense to product disparagement by comparison.
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that attribute absolute, rather than comparative, qualities to the defendant's
product, however, may give rise to a cause of action because they exceed the
traditional grounds of seller puffing. 72 Accordingly, the puffing rule requires
courts to determine whether a particular statement is a mere comparison or
actually sets forth positive defects in another's products.
73
In National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co. 74 National Refining
allegedly disparaged the plaintiff's product, Benzo Gas, by stating that any
gas containing benzol was harmful to vehicles. National Refining, which
produced White Rose gas and competed with Benzo, stated that benzol ex-
ploded instantaneously when ignited and thereby ruined vehicles' bearings,
cylinders, and valves and overheated vehicles' engines. National Refining
further stated that the federal government refused to use benzol in its army
vehicles and that benzol had caused vehicles to malfunction during the war.
Based on its appraisal of National Refining's statements, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that such statements constituted actionable product
disparagement because they were not mere comparison, but pointed out ac-
tual defects in Benzo's products.75
Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Laboratories, Inc.7 6 is one
of the best-known cases involving a competitor's statements that go beyond
mere comparison to affirmatively disparage the plaintiff's products. Bow-
man and Salsbery both manufactured veterinary pharmaceuticals. Salsbery
stated in the journal it published that an in-house lab test and a test per-
formed by the state's food commissioner indicated that a particular medicine
Bowman manufactured consisted only of ordinary brown sugar and bran.
Salsbery further stated that the state farm bureau was about to take action to
prevent the sale of Bowman's products. Bowman alleged in its complaint
that Salsbery's statements implied that its products were worthless and
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128 n.74. "To say that a merchant's advertisements
are puffing states, in effect, that no cause of action can be based upon the representations" and
that the puffing privilege is a complete defense to any such action. Smith-Victor Corp. v.
Sylvania Elec. Prods., 242 F. Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1965). "The puffing rule amounts to a
seller's privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing specific, on the theory that no
reasonable man would believe him or ... would be influenced by such talk." Id. (citing W.
PROSSER, TORTS 739 (3d ed. 1981)).
72. Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Il1. 1974).
Courts have held a competitor's express statement that the plaintiff's product is worthless or
useless to be clearly actionable because such statements obviously exceed the boundaries of
comparison. See Smith, supra note 2, at 135.
73. See Smith, supra note 2, at 135; infra note 86 and accompanying text (distinguishing
between false, favorable statements about advertiser's own goods and disparaging misrepresen-
tations of goods of advertiser's competitor).
74. 20 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1927).
75. Id. at 768. The National Refining court examined the issue of whether the statements
also constituted personal defamation of the owner of the business. The court held the state-
ments did not constitute libel per se, despite the fact that they alleged the product was danger-
ous or harmful, because the statements did not indicate that Benzo had knowledge of the
danger. Id. at 771; see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between
disparagement and defamation).
76. 17 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1926).
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would not cure animals.77 Although the Bowman court's primary concern
was whether the statements also constituted defamation, 78 the court ac-
cepted Bowman's argument and indicated that the statements were sufficient
to state a cause of action for disparagement because they were not mere
comparisons.
79
Courts have held that other statements exceeded comparison and consti-
tuted actionable disparagement, including: statements that an advertiser
was the only photographer offering a certain type of photo processing,80
statements that an advertiser's extract of meat was the only genuine brand,81
and statements that certain wood blocks for streets sold by an advertiser's'
competitor had rotted rapidly. 82
D. Federal Statutory Remedies for Product Disparagement
1. The Federal Trade Commission Act
Under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act) the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has a duty to prevent the use of unfair
methods of competition in commerce. 83 The FTC Act provides that when-
ever the FTC believes that a person or a corporation is engaging in an unfair
method of competition or an unfair or deceptive trade practice, it may issue
a complaint against, and grant a hearing to, the alleged violator.84 If the
hearing establishes that the conduct violates the FTC Act, the FTC may
require the violator to discontinue the unlawful practice by using a cease-
and-desist order against the violator.8 5 Pursuant to its duty to prevent un-
fair competition, the FTC prohibits competitors from making false and dis-
paraging statements about another's products or business. 86
In Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC 87 a manufacturer of plastic containers sought
review of an FTC order that directed the company to cease and desist from
making representations about the danger of storing food in aluminum. 88
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the FTC's findings were con-
77. Bowman alleged that the statements implied the medicine was "a fraud and a hum-
bug." Id. at 257.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. George v. Blow, 20 N.S.W.L.R. 395 (1899) (statement implied positive defect in photo
processing by all competitors including plaintiff), cited in Smith, supra note 2, at 135-36 n.53.
81. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Anderson, 55 L.T.R. 206 (1886) (statement implied all
competing brands were not genuine), cited in Smith, supra note 2, at 135-36 n.53.
82. Alcott v. Millar's Forests, 21 T.L.R. 30 (1904) (statement was not comparison of
plaintiff and defendant's products, but was positive disparagement pointing out defects in
plaintiff's product), cited in Smith, supra note 2, at 135-36 n.53..
83. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. 1 1984) [hereinaf-
ter FTC Act]. Congress enacted the FTC Act in 1914 to strengthen and add uniformity to the
antitrust laws. See Comment, Private Enforcement and Rulemaking Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Expansion of FTC Responsibility, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 462, 469 (1974).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982 & Supp. 1 1984).
85. Id. The FTC Act provides for judicial review of cease-and-desist orders. Id.
86. See Comment, supra note 83, at 463; Note, supra note 7, at 67.
87. 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941).
88. The FTC order directed Perma-Maid to stop representing that preparing or keeping
food in aluminum utensils can injure the consumer, that preparing food with aluminum uten-
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clusive and sufficient to support the cease-and-desist order. 89 According to
the court, the fact that Perma-Maid later forbade its agents to make or dis-
tribute the disparaging statements and punished agents who violated its in-
structions did not warrant setting aside the FTC order.90 The Perma-Maid
court emphasized that the FTC could not discharge its duty to prevent un-
fair competition by dismissing its complaint upon discontinuation of the ob-
jectionable practices9 ' and stated that Perma-Maid's abandonment of such
unfair practices did not render the controversy moot.92 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit held that the FTC could discharge its duty only by issuing and
enforcing the appropriate cease-and-desist order. 93 The court upheld the
FTC order, stating that the order did not injure Perma-Maid and that the
order would effectively aid the company in its efforts to end the unfair
practice.94
In addition to reviewing the enforceability of FTC orders, courts also have
addressed whether the FTC Act affords product disparagement plaintiffs a
private cause of action against those who injure them by violating the FTC
Act. Although certain courts have refused to grant a private action to plain-
tiffs under the FTC Act,95 other courts have held that the FTC Act affords
plaintiffs a private cause of action. In Guernsey v. Rich Plan 96 the Guern-
seys' complaint alleged that they had been victimized by the defendant's un-
fair and deceptive practices in violation of the FTC Act. Rich Plan moved
for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.97
Rich Plan based its motion upon the theory that the FTC Act itself contains
no provisions for private enforcement because the FTC has original jurisdic-
tion over the acts of which the Guernseys complained. 98 Under the doctrine
sils causes poisons to form, and that eating food prepared or stored in aluminum utensils will
cause ulcers, cancers, and other diseases,
89. Id. at 284.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 284-85.
92. Id. (citing FTC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257, 260 (1938)). The
Perma-Maid court rejected the manufacturer's argument that because the company had al-
ready abandoned the unfair practices in question, the controversy was moot. 121 F.2d at 284.
The court emphasized the FTC's duty to prevent unfair competition. Id. at 284. Accordingly,
the fact that the company discontinued such practices did not guarantee that it would not
resume such practices and, therefore, did not render the issue moot. Id.
Generally, an action is moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
issues involved have ceased to exist. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (per
curiam); see Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1383-86 (1973); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373,
374 (1974). The doctrine of mootness stems from the constitutional requirement that a "case"
or "controversy" exist before federal courts can assert jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsT. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937). In addition to this consti-
tutional component, however, the mootness doctrine also involves considerations of judicial
prudence. See Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125-27 (1974).
93. 121 F.2d at 284-85.'
94. Id. at 285.
95. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
96. Id.
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
98. Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 586; see LaSalle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Hender-
son, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (private parties may not seek relief under
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of implication, a federal regulatory statute implies a private right of action if
the court determines: (1) that the defendant has violated a statutory provi-
sion that Congress designed to protect a class of persons including the plain-
tiffs from the type of harm of which the plaintiffs complain, and (2) that the
purpose of the statute indicates the propriety of affording plaintiffs the rem-
edy they seek.9 9
The Guernsey court noted that federal courts have refused to imply a pri-
vate action from the FTC Act. 1 o The court pointed out, however, that until
Holloway v. Bristol Meyers Corp.,1° I only injured competitors sought relief
under the FTC Act as private litigants. In Holloway the FTC had not taken
any action regarding Bristol-Meyers at the time that the private litigants
filed suit against the company. In contrast, the FTC had issued administra-
tive rulings and cease-and-desist orders against Rich Plan at the time that
the Guernseys filed suit. The Guernsey court distinguished the Holloway de-
cision on that ground. 10 2 The Guernsey court held that the Guernseys could
maintain a private cause of action under the FTC Act and that there was no
reason to subrogate consumer interest to expert administrative judgment
since the FTC already had issued administrative orders.10 3
The Guernsey court also noted that although the FTC had primary juris-
diction over complaints under the FTC Act, it did not have exclusive juris-
diction. 104 Under the doctrine of implication, the court determined that the
FTC Act afforded the Guernseys a private cause of action. 10 5 The Guernsey
court emphasized the lack of effective FTC prevention of unfair and decep-
tive practices to justify its holding under the implication doctrine. 106
2. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act
While the purpose of the FTC Act is to prevent unfair competition and
unfair or deceptive practices, 10 7 Congress specifically intended the Lanham
FTC Act in federal courts because FTC, rather than courts, has original jurisdiction over
claims under FTC Act), rev'd in part on other grounds, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971).
99. Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 586.
100. Id.
101. 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In the Holloway
case the plaintiff filed a class action suit on behalf of people who purchased Excedrin pain
reliever in reliance on Bristol-Myers' advertising representations. Holloway alleged that Bris-
tol-Myers misrepresented the effectiveness of Excedrin. The Holloway court refused to find a
private cause of action under the FTC Act, however, and held that consumers may obtain
redress solely through the FTC's administrative rulings. 327 F. Supp. at 22; see Guernsey, 408
F. Supp. at 586-87 (discussing Holloway case).
102. Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 587.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 588 (citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 597 (1926)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 586-87; see Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of Private
Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 274, 278-90 (1975);
Grady & Freeman, Advertising and the FTC: How Much Can You "Puff" Until You're Legally
Out of Breath?, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 399, 399-411 (1984); Sullivan & Marks, The FTC's Decep-
tive Advertising Policy: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 64 OR. L. REV. 593, 596-632 (1986);
White, FTC: Wrong Agency for the Job of Adjudication, 61 A.B.A.J. 1242, 1245 (1975); Com-
ment, supra note 83, at 463-86.
107. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Trade-Mark Act (the Lanham Act)108 to eliminate deceitful practices in-
volving the misuse of trademarks. 10 9 In Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v.
Dietene Co. 110 the Seventh Circuit stated that although Congress intended
the Lanham Act to cover misrepresentations that do not involve trade-
marks, "' courts should construe section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to include
only such false descriptions or representations as are of substantially the
same economic nature as those involving misuse of the trademarks. 12 Ac-
cording to the court, section 43(a) does not encompass every undesirable
business practice involving deception." 3 Rather, the court stated, when
such deceptive practices fall outside the field of the trademark laws, they are
likewise outside the scope of section 43(a), particularly when they come
within the scope of other federal statutes such as the FTC Act. 114 The
108. Lanham Trade-Mark Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) [hereinafter Lanham
Act]. The Lanham Act provides that anyone who uses any goods, any false description or
representation in connection with any goods and causes such goods to enter into commerce
shall be liable in a civil action to any person who believes he is likely to be injured by the use of
such false description or representation. Id.
109. Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1969)
(citing Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949),
aff'd, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
By enacting § 43(a) of the Lanham Act in 1946, Congress created a new federal statutory
cause of action applicable to certain types of unfair competition in interstate commerce. Skil
Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 781 (N.D. Ill. 1974). For discussion of the
legislative history and subsequent developments under the Lanham Act, see Derenberg, Fed-
eral Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or
Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1029, 1029-39 (1957); Weil, Protectability of Trademark Values
Against False Competitive Advertising, 44 CAL. L. REV. 527, 537 (1956); Weston, Trademarks
and Unfair Competition, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 143, 148-54 (1984); Zlinkoff, Erie v.
Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-marks and Unfair Competition, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 955, 974-86 (1942); Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Its Development and Poten-
tial, 3 Loy. U.L.J. 327, 333 (1972); Comment, Consumer Motivation In Trademark and Unfair
Competition Law: On The Importance of Source, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1986).
110. 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
111. The Lanham Act uses the term "trademark" to include "any word, name, symbol, or
device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to iden-
tify and distinguish his goods ... from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate
the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. III 1985).
112. 415 F.2d at 1283.
113. In Dietene Bernard Food brought a diversity action against Dietene seeking damages
for false disparagement of one of its products in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Bernard manufactured an instant custard mix containing no egg solids. Soon thereafter,
Dietene began marketing its quick egg custard mix containing egg solids. Later, Bernard be-
gan to market an instant egg custard also containing egg solids. Dietene's chemist made a
comparison sheet of Dietene's egg custard product and Bernard's eggless custard mix. The
chemist was unaware of Bernard's newer egg product and based his comparison upon data for
the old eggless mix. Moreover, he failed to distinguish the old product from the new product.
Bernard filed a complaint with the FTC upon obtaining a copy of the comparison sheet,
although Dietene distributed the sheet to only a few Dietene employees. The FTC closed the
matter soon after the defendant agreed not to use the sheet in future advertising. Bernard then
initiated the diversity action seeking damages for Dietene's alleged violation of the Lanham
Act, although Bernard showed no lost sales or other damages.
114. Dietene, 415 F.2d at 1283-84 (citing Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87
F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (per curiam). In Skil
Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. I1. 1974), the court set forth the
elements a plaintiff must allege according to the Dietene holding to state a claim under § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act. The elements are: (1) the defendant made false statements of fact about
its own product in its comparison advertisements; (2) these advertisements actually deceived or
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Dietene court concluded that the Lanham Act does not apply to misrepre-
sentations concerning a competitor's product, but only applies to false or
deceitful representations that a manufacturer or merchant makes about his
own products or goods.' 15
Although Dietene held that a product disparagement plaintiff may not re-
cover under the Lanham Act, other courts have suggested that the Act does
afford a private cause of action for product disparagement. In Smith- Victor
Corp. v. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. 116 the court examined the question
of whether the Lanham Act gave the plaintiff standing to bring suit for pecu-
niary loss.1 7 The court rejected Sylvania's argument that the Lanham Act
applied only to trademarks and held that the Lanham Act provided Smith-
Victor a case of action because Sylvania had falsely represented its own
product to the detriment of Smith-Victor. 118 The Smith- Victor court ratio-
nalized its conclusion by pointing to the legislative intent of the statute: to
regulate commerce and to protect people engaged in commerce against un-
fair competition. 19 Accordingly, the court reasoned that Congress did not
intend the Lanham Act to apply only to trademark cases.' 20
may deceive a substantial segment of their audience; (3) such deception is material and is likely
to influence the purchasing decision; (4) the defendant caused its falsely advertised goods to
enter interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been, or is likely to be, injured either by
direct diversion of sales from itself to the defendant, or by the decrease in the goodwill that its
products enjoy with the buying public. Id.
115. 415 F.2d at 1284; see L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651
(3d Cir. 1954) (allegation that defendant used photograph of plaintiff's more expensive dress to
advertise defendant's inexpensive dress and that misrepresentation caused plaintiff to lose busi-
ness because customers mistakenly believed that plaintiff's dress actually was worth less stated
cause of action under Lanham Act); General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp.
383, 385-86 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (plaintiff stated cause of action under Lanham Act by alleging
defendant's use, in its advertising, of picture of pool that plaintiff installed, although act does
not require plaintiff to show actual palming off).
Not all courts, however, have seen the logic of the Dietene court's distinction. In Skil Corp.
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782 n. 10 (N.D. Ill. 1974), the court found it illogical
to distinguish between a misrepresentation about the plaintiff's product and a misrepresenta-
tion about the defendant's product when the defendant uses the particular statement in com-
parison advertising. The Skil court found no justification for allowing the plaintiff a cause of
action in the former instance but not in the latter. The court noted that in comparison adver-
tising a false statement by the defendant about the plaintiff's product has the same detrimental
effect as a false statement about the defendant's product. Id. Such a misrepresentation by the
defendant would tend to deceive the public concerning the respective qualities of the products
and possibly induce the purchase of an inferior product. Id.
116. 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965). For a discussion of the competitors puffing issue in
Smith- Victor, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
117. 242 F. Supp. at 309-10.
118. Id. at 310; see also U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1253 (D.
Ariz. 1981) (statements placed in ad with knowledge or intent that they will affect consumer's
judgment are not puffery, but constitute actionable representations within meaning of Lanham
Act), aff'd, 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982). In Smith-Victor, Sylvania falsely advertised that its
product, designed to provide light for movie camera filming, produced an amount of candle-
power equivalent to the light produced by the type of product that Smith-Victor manufac-
tured. Sylvania's statements were absolute representations rather than mere comparative
puffing.
119. Smith-Victor, 242 F. Supp. at 310; see Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. III
1985).
120. Id. But see Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). In Dietene the court noted that only one phrase
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After determining that Smith-Victor had standing to sue under the Lan-
ham Act, the court addressed whether section 43 of the Lanham Act re-
tained the common law requirement of palming off.' 2 ' The Smith- Victor
court observed that the statute does not refer to palming off or to a defend-
ant's false advertising about a plaintiff's product and that the provision re-
fers only to the advertising of one's own product. 122 The Smith- Victor court
based its conclusions upon those observations and concluded that the Lan-
ham Act did not incorporate the common law requirement of palming off. 123
E. Injunctive Relief
Many product disparagement plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in addition
to, or instead of, monetary damages. Because injunctions are a form of equi-
table relief rather than a legal remedy, traditional rules of equity apply.' 24
The fundamental principles of equity jurisdiction state that equity intervenes
only if necessary to prevent irreparable harm and if the remedy at law is
inadequate. 125 Applying the principles of equity jurisdiction, courts have
traditionally held that equity will not enjoin defamation.' 26 Moreover,
courts carried over the rule to the law of disparagement. 127
Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields ' 28 continues to be the leading case in sup-
of the intent paragraph in § 45 of the Lanham Act failed to use the word "mark." Id. The
court stated that the phrase, in such a context, refers not to every potentially unfair competi-
tive practice, but only to the type of unfair competition that is closely associated with the
misuse of trademarks. Id. at 1283-84. According to the Dietene court, that type of unfair
competition or trademark misuse is the passing off of one's own goods as those of a competitor.
Id. Thus, the court concluded that the Lanham Act applied only to cases of passing off goods.
Id.
121. Smith-Victor, 242 F. Supp. at 310. The court noted the conflict between other courts
on this issue. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 310-11.
124. See Weinbrager v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1981); Kidd v. Horry, 28
F. 773, 776 (E.D. Pa. 1886); Note, Corporate Defamation, supra note 3, at 993.
125. Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1984); Birch
v. Mazander, 678 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1982); Goadby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 639 F.2d
117, 122 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing, inter alia, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)); see
Gold, Does Equity Still Lack Jurisdiction to Enjoin LIbel or Slander?, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV.
231, 235-48 (1982); Comment, Enjoining Product Disparagement: Discarding the Defamation
Analogy, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 205, 205-16 (1986); Note, Corporate Defamation, supra note 3, at
994.
126. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(citing Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 198 F. Supp. 508, 510-11 (D.D.C. 1961), aff'd, 309
F.2d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 1967); Huskey
v. NBC, 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (citing Venturelli v. Trovcio, 346 111. App.
429, 432, 105 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1952); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376, 378
(D.D.C. 1957) (citing American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 353-58 (2d Cir. 1913); see
Barteloman, Injunctions Against Speech and Writing: A Re-Evaluation, 59 Ky. L.J. 319, 322-
26, 339-47 (1970); Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personalty, 29
HARV. L. REV. 640, 641-68 (1916); Note, Temporary Injunctions in Libel Cases, 25 BAYLOR
L. REV. 527, 527-35 (1973),
127. Baltimore Cross-Wheel Co. v. Benies, 29 F. 95 (D. Mass. 1886); Kidd v. Harry, 28 F.
773 (E.D. Pa. 1886); Chase v. Tuttle, 27 F. 110 (N.D.N.Y. 1886); accord Martin v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 984-85 (D. Ore. 1963); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y.
384, 64 N.E. 163, 164 (1902).
128. Marlin, 64 N.E. at 164. For a discussion of the facts of Marlin in connection with the
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port of the proposition that equity cannot restrain product disparage-
ment. 129 The principal issue in the case was whether a court could enjoin in
equity Shield's disparagement of Marlin's products when Marlin had no
remedy at law because Marlin was unable to establish the requisite special
damages. 130 The Marlin court held that it could not issue an injunction to
restrain the disparagements even though Marlin had no legal remedy.' 3'
The court based its holding on the theory that the guaranty of free speech
and press prohibits the issuance of injunctions against all forms of speech
and press and that only the law of defamation places a limit on free speech
and press.132 The Marlin court ruled, in effect, that the constitutional guar-
anty limited Marlin to only remedies at law.133
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have held that injunctions may is-
sue to restrain product disparagement under certain circumstances. For ex-
ample, some courts have held that because product disparagement
necessarily involves property rights, equity will protect those interests when
no adequate legal remedy exists. 134 In Carter v. Knapp Motor Co. 135 Knapp
sought to enjoin Carter from publicly exhibiting Carter's Hudson car deco-
rated with a characture of a large white elephant painted against a dark
background entitled "Hudson."' 136 The court reasoned that Knapp pos-
sessed a property right to conduct this business without the wrongful inter-
ference of others.' 37 The Knapp court further reasoned that Knapp
possessed a property right in the enjoyment of the good name and good will
of his business and in the exercise of his employment or trade.' 38 Accord-
ingly, the court held that equity may protect these property rights by in-
junction if necessary. 139
After resolving the threshold issue of its jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief in a product disparagement setting, the Knapp court considered what
court's finding that the product disparagement did not also constitute a libel of the manufac-
turer, see supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
129. 64 N.E. at 167.
130. Id. at 165. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (special damages constitute
essential element of disparagement action).
131. 64 N.E. at 167. The court's opinion does not clarify whether it so holds despite the
fact that Marlin had no adequate remedy at law, or because of the fact that Marlin's lack of
adequate legal remedy was due to his inability to show special damages. See id. at 165-67.
132. Id. at 165. For a discussion of the first amendment guaranty of free speech and press
as a defense to defamation and disparagement actions, see infra text accompanying notes 156-
200.
133. See 64 N.E. at 165.
134. Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943); Menard v. Howle,
298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937); H.E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229
N.Y.S. 692 (1928).
135. 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943).
136. Knapp alleged that the white elephant symbol denoted something of an inferior qual-
ity, cast a slur on any product so labelled, and indicated that the product was not merchanta-
ble and was of no value. Knapp further alleged that the injury caused by Carter's
disparagement was not capable of being measured by any monetary standard and that the loss
of business caused thereby also was incapable of exact measurement.
137. Knapp, 11 So. 2d at 384.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 384-85.
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circumstances compel the issuance of an injunction.140 The court accepted
the rule that equity ordinarily will not intervene to restrain the publication
of false words merely because of their falsity.' 41 The Knapp court distin-
guished Marlin, however, by stating that equity will intervene when restraint
becomes necessary to preserve a property interest threatened by other tor-
tious or illegal acts.1 42 The Knapp court held that equity will enjoin a publi-
cation that is "merely an instrument and incident" of such other torts.1 43
Accordingly, the court distinguished between cases involving only the dis-
paragement of a product and those also involving other tortious interference
with business relations. 144 Moreover, the court stated that examples of such
other tortious or illegal acts included conspiracy, intimidations, and coer-
cion. 145 After drawing this distinction, the Knapp court found in the actions
of Carter the requisite elements of tortious interference or coercion. 146
Courts have avoided the rule in Marlin not only by recognizing a property
interest 147 or by finding coercion, 148 but also by finding that certain com-
plaints actually stated claims of unfair competition rather than of disparage-
ment.' 49 In Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Association 10 Black & Yates
140. Id. at 385.
141. Id. at 385-86; see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
142. 11 So. 2d at 385. The Knapp court relied upon the opinion of Chief Justice Cordozo
in Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690, 694 (1931). Courts are capable of judging
the acts that people do while claiming a constitutional right such as freedom of speech and of
determining whether any limitations on the claimed right exist. Knapp, 11 So. 2d at 386 (cit-
ing Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942)).
143. Knapp, 11 So. 2d at 385 (citing Nann, 174 N.E. at 694).
144. See id,
145. Id. The Marlin court also indicated that coercion, intimidation and conspiracy might
constitute an exception to the rule that equity may not enjoin disparagement. Marlin, 64 N.E.
at 166.
146. Knapp, 11 So. 2d at 385-86. Although in Marlin the court found that Shields' publica-
tion of sham letters disparaging Marlin's product clearly was intended to coerce Marlin to
resume advertising in Shields' magazine, the court found that Shields' coercion was insufficient
to justify an exception to the rule against enjoining disparagement. 64 N.E. at 165-67.
Compare DeRitis v. AHZ Corp., 444 So. 2d 93 (Fla. App. 1984) (affirmed issuance of in-
junction to restrain purchasers of condominium from displaying in windows of unit pictures of
lemons and signs disparaging units because owner had contractual right to regulate signs;
owners characterized action as tortious interference with contractual relationship and prospec-
tive advantage) with Singer v. Romerrick Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N.Y.S.2d 607
(1938) (refused to enjoin disparagement of home builder's houses, although defendant intended
to coerce builder to reduce purchase price).
147. Knapp, 11 So. 2d at 384-85; see supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
148. Knapp, 11 So. 2d at 385; see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
149. Black & Yates, Inc. v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1941), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 129 F.2d 232, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942); H.E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App.
Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (1928). The general rule is that courts may grant injunctions to
restrain unfair competition, claims of which could arise in trademarks cases. American Steel
Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926). For a discussion of the possibilities of
recovering for product disparagement under The Lanham Trade-mark Act, see supra notes
107-123 and accompanying text.
In Aerosonic Corp. v. Trodyne Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1968), the court noted
that Florida courts permit the issuance of an injunction to restrain unfair competition. Id. at
227 (citing Creamette Co. v. Conlin, 191 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1951)). The Aerosonic court
stated that many jurisdictions permit the issuance of injunctions to restrain unfair competition
involving trade secrets. Id. at 227-28 (citing Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. &
Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1965); Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 497-99 (2d
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sought to enjoin the Association from making disparaging statements about
Black & Yates' "Philipines mahogany" wood. The Black & Yates court in-
terpreted the complaint as stating a cause of action for unfair competition
against the Association.' s By construing Black & Yates' complaint as an
unfair competition claim, the court not only avoided the Marlin rule that
equity will not enjoin disparagement, but also rejected the rule outright. 152
The court based its holding on the distinctions between product disparage-
ment and defamation.' 53 According to the Black & Yates court, product
disparagement necessarily involves the property rights, coercion, and unfair
competition exceptions to the anti-injunction rule. 154 As a result the court
held that product disparagement compelled injunctive relief.155
F Qualified Privilege as a Defense to a Product Disparagement Action
A defendant in a product disparagement suit may defeat a plaintiff's claim
by showing that the plaintiff failed to prove one or more of the elements of
the cause of action.' 56 A defendant also may defeat a product disparage-
ment claim by pleading and proving an affirmative defense. Privilege consti-
tutes the principal affirmative defense to a product disparagement claim.' 57
Privileges may be absolute or qualified.' 58 An absolute privilege completely
immunizes the defendant from liability for the publication of potentially dis-
paraging statements.' 59 A qualified privilege, however, merely creates a re-
buttable presumption that the publisher is not liable.16° A plaintiff may
rebut the presumption by showing that the defendant made the statement
with malice or with bad faith, or by showing that the statements were exces-
Cir. 1953); Shellmar Prod. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936); A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 74 F.2d 934, 935 (6th Cir. 1935)). The courts cited by
Aerosonic allowed the enjoining, to some extent, of the defendants' use of the trade secrets. See
Aerosonic, 191 F.2d at 227-28. Some courts predicate their decisions to restrain the use of
trade secrets on the basis that trade secrets constitute protectable property interests. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemorus Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917); see supra notes 137-39
and accompanying text.
150. 129 F.2d. 227 (3d Cir. 1941).
151. Id. An injunction is the standard remedy for the traditional type of unfair competi-
tion known as passing off. The court does not explain how disparagement by a competitor
could ever be construed as not giving rise to an action for unfair competition. See Note, Corpo-
rate Defamation, supra note 3, at 1000-01; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text; text
accompanying notes 87-93.
152. Black & Yates, 129 F.2d at 229. But see Note, supra note 124, at 1003 (asserting that
Black & Yates court may have reached erroneous holding that product disparagement may be
enjoined and noting that fact weakened decision as precedent).
153. Black & Yates, 129 F.2d at 232.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also H.E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229 N.Y.S. 692 (1928)
(equity may enjoin product disparagement when case involves unfair competition).
156. For a discussion of the elements of product disparagement, see supra notes 37-60 and
accompanying text.
157. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinal Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220, 225 (1986)






sive.16 1 Because product disparagement plaintiffs must prove malice as an
element of their cause of action, 162 however, disparagement defendants may
always allege a qualified privilege.' 63
Although the common law historically afforded qualified privilege to fair
comments, it failed to extend the qualified privilege to false statements. 16
Accordingly, courts must consider what statements qualify as fair comment,
whether the constitutional guaranty of free speech and press limits the fair
comment privilege, 165 and whether statements of opinion may ever be
false. 166
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 167 the United States Supreme Court
determined the extent of the first amendment 168 constitutional protections'
limitations on a state's power to award damages in a defamation action
brought by a public official based on statements that criticize his official con-
duct. 169 The Supreme Court asserted that the constitution placed limits on a
citizen's right to engage in libel or defamation. 170 The Court further as-
serted that the first amendment guaranty of freedom of expression failed to
incorporate any exceptions for true statements. 71 The New York Times
Court held that the constitution prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory false statement relating to his official conduct,
unless the official can prove with convincing clarity 172 that the defendant
made the statement with actual malice; that is, with knowledge of its falsity
or with reckless disregard therefor. 73
Applying the New York Times rule to private figures, the Supreme Court
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 174 held that a private-figure plaintiff in a defa-
mation action must allege and prove fault on the part of the defendant. 175
161. Id. (citing Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 347, 374-75, 149 A.2d
193, 202 (1959)).
162. 516 A.2d at 225; see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (plaintiffs in disparage-
ment actions have burden of proving malice). But see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
(plaintiffs in a defamation action need not show malice). Defamation plaintiffs must show
malice only in order to overcome a defense of qualified privilege or first amendment protection.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-61.
163. Diary Stores, 516 A.2d at 225.
164. Id. at 226-27.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 160-66; see also Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmine
and the Neglected Fair Comment Defense, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 10-37 (1980); Note, Fair
Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1211-12 (1949).
166. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 167-76 and accompanying
text.
167. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
168. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
169. 376 U.S. at 256.
170. Id. at 264.
171. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270-71.
172. Id. at 285-86. The standard of proof is "convincing clarity." Id. But see Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (standard reformulized as "clear and convincing
proof").
173. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
147-48, 155 (1975) (public figures, as well as public officials, must meet New York Times actual
malice requirement to ensure uninhibited debates).
174. 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
175. Id. at 347.
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The Gertz Court stated, however, that private-figure plaintiffs may recover
damages on a less demanding showing than that required by New York
Times for public-figure plaintiffs. 176
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps 177 the Supreme Court set forth
in detail the first amendment restrictions on common law defamation. 78
The Philadelphia Newspapers Court pointed to the distinction between pri-
vate and public figures and whether the speech is of public concern as impor-
tant factors in determining the existence and extent of first amendment
restrictions on defamation.179 According to the Court, when a speech is of
public concern and the plaintiff is a public official or figure, the first amend-
ment requires that the plaintiff show falsity and actual malice.' 80 When a
speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure, however, the
first amendment requires that the plaintiff show falsity' 8' and mere fault,
instead of malice, to recover actual damages.1 82 Finally, when a speech is of
private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, the first amendment re-
quires no change in the common law.' 8 3
The Philadelphia Newspapers Court recognized that in cases in which the
factfinder is unable to decide whether the statement is true or false, the bur-
den of proof may be dispositive. 184 Accordingly, the Court admitted that
the first amendment requires the Court to protect some falsehood in order to
protect public speech.' 8 5
176. Id. at 348; see supra note 172. The Gertz Court reached this conclusion after consider-
ing the legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel, the fact that private figures have
less access to the media to counteract defamation, and the fact that such private figures have
not voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
106 S. Ct. 1558, 1562, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783, 791 (1986) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, 344-45); see
Note, Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 51
BROOKLYN L. REV. 425, 430-66 (1985). The Gertz Court further stated that a private-figure
plaintiff must show actual malice to recover punitive damages, although he may recover actual
damages by showing mere fault. Philadelphia Newspapers, 106 S. Ct. at 1562, 89 L. Ed. 2d at
791 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1985) (in cases involving private-figure plaintiff and
private speech, plaintiff need not show actual malice in order to recover punitive damages).
177. 106 S. Ct. 1558, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1986).
178. Id. at 1563, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 791-92.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
181. Id., 89 L. Ed. 2d at 792. The Philadelphia Newspapers Court maintained that the
common law rule, which states that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth must
fall to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well
as fault, before recovering damages. Id.; Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, RUTGERS L.J. 471, 487
(1975); see Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
1205, 1214-19 (1976); Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 157, 175 (1977).
182. Philadelphia Newspapers, 106 S. Ct. at 1563, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 792 (citing Gertz, 418
U.S. at 347-48).
183. Id. at 1563, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 792 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2939; Philadel-
phia Newspapers, 106 S. Ct. at 1563, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 593).
184. Id. at 1563; 89 L. Ed. 2d at 792.
185. Id. at 1564-65, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 793-94 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341). The Court
noted, however, that evidence offered to show fault will generally encompass evidence of the
falsity of the matters asserted. Id. at 1565, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 794. But see id. at 1571, 89 L. Ed.
2d at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (As long as the plaintiff has the burden of proving fault a
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The commercial speech doctrine enunciated in Valentine v. Chrestensen 186
originally provided that the constitutional guaranty of free speech and press
did not protect purely commercial advertising. 18 7 The Valentine Court rea-
soned that, as economic activity, commercial advertising is already subject to
government regulation under the commerce clause.18 8 The Court stated that
the government's power to restrain such advertisement, therefore, was a
lesser included power of the commerce power.18 9
In Bigelow v. Virginia 190 the Supreme Court narrowed the commercial
speech doctrine by holding that the first amendment protects commercial
speech if the speech contains factual material of public interest.' 9' The
Supreme Court subsequently held, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,192 that the first amendment may
protect truthful, purely commercial advertisements, so long as the advertise-
ments contain any material of public interest. 193
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of US., Inc. 194 the Supreme Court first
confronted the question of whether the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard applied to product disparagement actions as well as to personal defa-
mation actions.' 95 The federal district court in Bose held that the actual
malice standard is applicable in product disparagement cases if the plaintiff
qualifies as a public figure for first amendment purposes. 19 6 The district
significant amount of true speech will not be deterred unless the private person victimized by a
malicious libel also can prove falsity; the majority's decision "trades on the good names of
private individuals with little first amendment coin to show for it.")
186. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
187. Id. at 54; see generally Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 429-48 (1971) (tracing
origin and development of commercial speech doctrine); Comment, The First Amendment and
The Basis of Liability in Actions for Corporate Libel and Product Disparagement, 27 EMORY
L.J. 755, 759-70 (1978) (discussing commercial speech doctrine); Note, Corporate Defamation,
supra note 3, at 972-74 (analyzing Valentine case). For a discussion of the rule that mere
competitive puffing does not constitute actionable disparagement, see supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
188. Id. at 54; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
189. 316 U.S. at 54.
190. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
191. Id. at 822-29. The advertisement in Bigelow was for abortion services.
192. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
193. Id. at 758-73.
194. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
195. See Note, The Future of Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense
of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477 (1986).
196. 508 F. Supp. 1249, 1270 (D. Mass. 1981). Courts regard corporations as public
figures. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220, 227 (1986)
(corporation selling meat products qualified as public figure because it conducted intensive
advertising campaign to attract customers); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341,
1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (corporation subject to state regulation qualified as public figure because
it owned over a billion dollars in assets in offering its stock at public sale). As a result, courts
have required plaintiff manufacturers to show actual malice in product disparagement actions,
especially when the product is intended for human consumption or otherwise affects public
health. Dairy Stores, 216 A.2d at 228-29.
Other courts have suggested, however, that the term "public figure" does not readily apply
to corporations or products. See Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220, 227 (1986). Public
figures include private figures who are so involved in a particular public controversy that they
become public figures for a limited range of issues. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
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court based its decision on two determinations. First, the Bose court noted
that court decisions involving similar facts held that the New York Times
standard applies outside the personal defamation context.1 97 Although
those courts applied the standard to corporate defamation actions, the state-
ments made by the defendants actually disparaged the quality of the corpo-
rate plaintiffs' products. 98 Second, the Bose court applied the New York
Times balancing test to determine that in product disparagement actions, the
concern for compensating injury to reputation is less than in personal defa-
mation actions because the statements disparage only the product itself.199
The interest in free speech and press, the court stated, is more important in
product disparagement cases than in personal defamation actions because
consumer interest is essential. 2°°
II. CURRENT STATE OF TEXAS LAW
A. Cause of Action in Texas
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Code) provides a pri-
vate cause of action for libel.201 Section 73.001 of the Code, which sets forth
the elements of libel, defines libel as a written defamation that injures the
reputation of another.202 Accordingly the statute on its face applies only to
U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974)). The Dairy Stores court observed that product manufacturers and
sellers are interested only in selling their products and not interested in becoming involved
with public controversies. Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 227. According to the Dairy Stores court,
therefore, the public figure test provides an inappropriate method for determining whether
statements about corporations and their products constitute actionable defamation. Id. at 228;
see Bruno & Stillman v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589-90 (lst Cir. 1980) (sale of
product cannot easily be deemed public controversy; health and safety information not basis
for applying actual malice standard to boat safety criticism); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956 (D.D.C. 1976) (rejecting public figure analysis as
inappropriate model for product disparagement cases); Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting
Co., 25 Cal. 3d 763, 160 Cal. Rptr. 87, 603 P.2d 14 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 (1980)
(person in business world advertising his wares does not necessarily become part of public
controversy).
197. Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1270.
198. Dairy Stores, 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220 (1986) (citing Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v.
Deaner, 612 F.2d 264, 280 (television report disparaged quality of corporate plaintiff's meat
and criticized its business practices); F&J Enterprises, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (report disparaged corporate plaintiffs
"Krazy Straw" product).
199. Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1270; see Note, Did Bose Speak Too Softly: Product Critiques
and The First Amendment, 14 HOFSrRA L. REV. 571 (1986).
200. 508 F. Supp. at 1270-71; see Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 222 (discussing application of
New York Times doctrine to corporate libel cases); see also Carman, Hutchinson v. Proxmire
and The Neglected Fair Comment Defense, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 10-37 (1980); Fetzer, The
Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure" Nailing the Jellyfish, 68
IOWA L. REV. 35, 37 (1982); Comment, supra note 187, at 760-61.
201. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986).
202. Id. Section 73.001 of the Code provides:
[L]ibel is a defamation expressed in written or other graphic form that tends too
injure a living person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public ha-
tred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's hon-
esty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone
and thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
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defamation actions.203 Furthermore, because the statute specifically requires
injury to personal reputation, 204 product disparagement claims fall outside
the scope of the statute.20 5 Nevertheless, the Texas Legislature has failed to
enact any statute providing a private cause of action for product disparage-
ment. As a result, plaintiffs must look to Texas courts to determine whether
state common law recognizes an action for product disparagement.
In Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner20 6 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered whether a plaintiff may recover for product disparage-
ment under Texas law. 20 7 The plaintiff in Jetco brought suit to recover dam-
ages and to enjoin the publication of false statements concerning the efficacy
of the Jetco hand-held metal detector. The Jetco trial court stated that
although many jurisdictions recognized a cause of action for product dispar-
agement or trade libel at common law,20 8 Texas courts have failed to follow
suit.20 9 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reiterated that the Texas libel statute
governed all libel actions in the state.210 The Jetco court cited Deen v. Sny-
der 211 as authority for its conclusion that the libel statute provides the defin-
itive definition of defamation 212 and that the Texas courts may not enact an
alternate definition of defamation. 21 3 Jetco alleged only that Gardiner had
printed false and defamatory statements about Jetco's product.214 Jetco's
complaint alleged a cause of action for false disparagement. 215 Moreover,
Jetco neither characterized its claim as one for defamation or libel nor al-
leged that Gardiner injured the reputation of Jetco or its owner. The Jetco
court, nevertheless, found Jetco's action to constitute a claim for libel under
the Texas statute because the statements, if false, would injure the reputation
of Jetco or its owner.216
The Jetco trial court held that Jetco also presented a cause of action under
Texas law for slander of property.217 The court chose not to address this
203. See Cranberg v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 756 F.2d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 1985);
Jetco Elee. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1233 (5th Cir. 1973) aff'g, 325 F. Supp.
80, 84 (S.D. Tex. 1971). For a discussion of the Jetco case, see infra notes 206-23 and accom-
panying text.
204. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986); see supra note 202.
205. Cranberg, 756 F.2d at 389; Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84.
206. 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973), afftg, 325 F. Supp. 80 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
207. 473 F.2d at 1233.
208. 325 F. Supp. at 84.
209. Id.
210. Id. At the time of decision the Texas libel statute was set forth in article 5430 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5430 (Vernon 1958). Section
73.001 of the codified statute is virtually identical to article 5430. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986).
211. 57 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ).
212. 473 F.2d at 1233.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 325 F. Supp. at 84.
216. Id. In Texas, whether a disparaging statement about a plaintiff's product also injures
business and is therefore actionable defamation or libel depends on whether the statement
implied reprehensible conduct on the part of the owner. Young v. Kuhn, 17 Tex. 645, 9 S.W.
860 (1886); accord Hibschman, supra note 2, at 631 (discussing Texas law).
217. Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84.
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alternative cause of action, however, but to analyze Jetco's claim as one for
libel because the statutory libel action required no special showing. 218 The
Jetco court cited Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Martin 219 for its asser-
tion that Jetco could recover for slander of property. 220 In Houston Chroni-
cle a Texas appeals court held that a false statement disparaging Martin's
goods was actionable despite the fact that the statement did not defame Mar-
tin's reputation.221 The Houston Chronicle court reasoned that although
words spoken regarding property do not in themselves constitute an actiona-
ble offense, a disparagement of Martin's property might injure Martin as
seriously as a personal defamation of Martin.222 The Houston Chronicle
court set forth the elements of an action for slander of property, stating that
a plaintiff must show falsity, malice, and special damages. 223
In Cranberg v. Consumers Union of US., Inc.224 the Fifth Circuit again
addressed the issue of whether a product disparagement plaintiff presents a
valid claim under Texas law.225 The Cranberg court examined product dis-
paragement and libel claims against Consumers Union for statements pub-
lished in a review of Cranberg's product, the Texas Fireframe.226 In
connection with its consideration of the plaintiff's product disparagement
claim, the Cranberg court concluded that Texas precedent made it uncertain
whether Texas recognized a cause of action for product disparagement or
trade libel.227 Accordingly, the court turned to an analysis of the plaintiff's
libel claim, citing Deen v. Snyder 228 for the proposition that no other defini-
tion of libel governs defamation or disparagement actions in Texas. 229 The
court followed the rule that all libel actions in Texas are governed by the
state libel statute. Moreover, the court recognized that the Texas statute
defines libel only in terms of injury to a person.230 The Cranberg court,
however, relied on Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews231 for the proposition that a
publication which refers to an identifiable individual may defame the owner
218. See id. If the court had not found that the statements were defamatory, it would have
decided the case as a slander of property action. Id. The Jetco court declined to state whether
Jetco might have asserted a cause of action under the Lanham Act, but cited Smith-Victor
Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965) as authority on the
issue. 325 F. Supp. at 84.
219. 5 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1928, writ dism'd).
220. 325 F. Supp. at 84.
221. 5 S.W.2d at 173 (citing M. NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL § 230 (4th ed. 1924)).
222. Id. at 173.
223. Id. According to the Houston Chronicle court, the special damages must be "proxi-
mately, naturally, and reasonably resulting to the owner of the property." Id. The court
stated that special damages constituted the principal component of the slander of property
action. Id.
224. 756 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1985).
225. Id. at 389.
226. Id. The Texas Fireframe is a double-decked fireplace grate that the plaintiff developed
and patented and that the plaintiff's sole proprietorship manufactured and sold.
227. Id. (citing Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84).
228. 57 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ); see supra notes 211-13
and accompanying text.
229. Cranberg, 756 F.2d at 389.
230. Id.
231. 339 S.W.2d 890 (1960); see infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
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of a business, without naming him, if readers could discern from the state-
ment that it referred to the owner.232 As a result, the court ruled that
Cranberg presented a valid cause of action under the Texas libel statute. 233
Following this logic, a product disparagement plaintiff could argue that
statements referring to the product impliedly identified, and thereby de-
famed, the plaintiff, despite the fact that the publication did not actually
name the plaintiff. The plaintiff could further contend that disparagement of
the product necessarily amounted to defamation of the individual or corpo-
rate plaintiff because the plaintiff owned the company that manufactured the
product. Even if Texas courts refuse to permit plaintiffs to bring product
disparagement claims under the libel statute,234 however, the Jetco and
Houston Chronicle decisions indicate that Texas plaintiffs may bring product
disparagement claims as actions for slander of property. 235 In Russell v.
Campbell236 a Texas court of appeals set forth the elements of the action for
slander of property or of title to property. According to the court, the plain-
tiff must allege and prove: (1) publication of the disparagement; (2) falsity of
the statement published; (3) the defendant's malice; (4) special damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff; and (5) the plaintiff's interest in the property dispar-
aged. 237 Texas courts have consistently recognized and enforced the
232. Id. at 893-94; see Gibler v. Houston Post Co., 310 S.W.2d 377, 381-85 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Red River Valley Publishing Co. v. Bridges, 254
S.W.2d 854, 858-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If a publication is clearly
defamatory to some person but does not refer to a specific person, the plaintiff bears the burden
of pleading and proving by way of the colloquim that the publication concerned the plaintiff.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 111. In Matthews the publications stated that a profes-
sional car wrecking ring was operating out of a local body shop and that charges had been filed
against two men who operated the Texas Body Shop. The publications named the two opera-
tors. Matthews had purchased the Texas Body Shop from the two men named in the article,
but the men remained as Matthews' employees. Although the article did not name Matthews,
Matthews contended that it fairly could be understood to refer to him, because it mentioned
his shop and referred to its operators, and because Matthews was known to be the shop's
owner. The court held that because the articles explicitly named the two men as the operators
of the shop, and because the article pointed to them as the operators of the shop as a front for
their activities, rather than to Matthews, the articles were not libelous as to Matthews. Mat-
thews, 339 S.W.2d at 894.
233. 756 F.2d at 389.
234. Courts may be reluctant to impute a lack of integrity to a business owner merely from
criticism of its products. Dairy Stores, 516 A.2d at 224; see Note, Corporate Defamation, supra
note 3, at 970-71; Note, Libel and the Corporate Plaintiff, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1496, 1499
(1969). In fact, courts have gone to some lengths in refusing to imply an accusation of per-
sonal inefficiency or incompetence directed against businesses or their products, particularly
when the statement charges the plaintiff with mere ignorance or negligence. Polygram
Records, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 550, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256 (1985) (citing
PROSSER & KEETON supra note 1, § 128).
False statements indicating that the plaintiff's business or goods were inferior are not defam-
atory because they do not accuse the plaintiff of dishonesty, lack of integrity or incompetence,
or imply any reprehensible personal characteristic. Polygram Records, 170 Cal. App. 3d at
550, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
235. For a discussion of slander of property, see supra notes 194-200 and accompanying
text.
236. Russell v. Campbell, 725 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no
writ) (citing Clark v. Lewis, 684 S.W.2d 161, 163-64 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ)).
237. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. First Wis. Mortg. Trust, 577 S.W.2d 312, 316
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established law in actions for slander of property or title.238 Although most
cases involved disparagement of a plaintiff's title to real property, the courts
recognized that the cause of action also applied to slander of a plaintiff's title
to personal property and to slander of the quality of a plaintiff's goods. 239
Texas courts also have applied the cause of action for slander of title to
cases involving business disparagement. 240 In Ward v. Gee24 Ward falsely
asserted that he was the owner of a grocery store and that Gee merely man-
aged the business for him. In a suit brought by Ward to receive the business,
Gee denied that Ward owned the grocery store and counter-sued Ward for
defamation. Upon consideration of the facts in Ward, the Eastland court of
appeals held that the false statements failed to give rise to an action for defa-
mation. 242 Because the false statements related to Ward's ownership of the
business, however, the court reasoned that the statements did create an ac-
tion for slander of title to his property. 243 The Ward court further reasoned
that under Houston Chronicle, disparagement of property or of title to prop-
erty is actionable when special damages result.244 The Ward court ruled
that injury to Gee's business constituted the sole source of special
damages.245
In Page v. Layne-Texas Co.246 the Galveston court of appeals expanded
liability for business disparagement. 247 Layne-Texas was a water and sewer
systems drilling subcontractor for Page. After a dispute developed between
the parties, Layne-Texas filed a false claim with Page's bonding company
that substantially impaired Page's vital bonding credit. Page filed a tort ac-
tion against Layne-Texas alleging that the false statements constituted busi-
ness disparagement, injurious falsehood, and unlawful interference with a
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Ellis v. Waldrop, 656 S.W.2d 902,
905 (Tex. 1983); A.H. Belo Corp. v. Sanders, 632 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Tex. 1982); Shell Oil
Co. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483, 490-92 (1942).
238. A.H. Belo Corp. v. Sanders, 632 S.W.2d 145, 145-46 (Tex. 1982) (citing Shell Oil Co.
v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483 (1942)); accord, Ellis, 656 S.W.2d at 905; Russell, 725
S.W.2d at 749; American Nat'l Bank & Trust, 577 S.W.2d at 316.
239. See Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 325 F. Supp. 80, 85 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Martin, 5 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1928, writ
dism'd)); M. NEWELL, supra note 221, at 196. Reliance on slander of title cases in determin-
ing product disparagement law is justified, in any event, by the fact that in both torts the
defendant's statements impair the vendibility of the object the plaintiff seeks to sell. System
Operations v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying New
Jersey law). The similarity between the two torts is such that the law of one is usually im-
parted without restraint into cases involving the other. Id. (concluding that New Jersey court
adjudicating product disparagement case would follow state precedents in slander of title cases
as well as in product disparagement cases).
240. See Ward v. Gee, 61 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ ref'd);
Page v. Layne-Texas Co., 258 S.W.2d 366, 368-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ
dism'd by agr.).
241. 61 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ ref'd).
242. Id. at 536.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing Houston Chronicle, 5 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1982, writ
dism'd)).
245. Id. at 556-57.
246. 258 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ dism'd by agr.).
247. See id. at 368-69.
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business enterprise.248 The Page court held that any willful and unjustified
interference with the business of another is actionable despite the fact that
such interference may not constitute statutory slander or libel.249 Although
the court spoke in terms of tortious interference with economic relations, it
implied that disparagement claims are actionable even though they fall
outside the scope of the Texas libel statute.250 Product disparagement plain-
tiffs could argue under Page, therefore, that malicious false statements about
their products constitute actionable intentional business interference. 251
The most recent Texas case involving business disparagement is Gulf At-
lantic Life Insurance Co. v. Hurlbut.252 In that case, the president of Gulf
Atlantic made statements to the assistant attorney general alleging that
Hurlbut and another insurance agent, both of whom were former employees
of Gulf Atlantic, were engaged in fraudulent and illegal business activities.
Hurlbut brought an action for fraud, business disparagement, and tortious
interference with a contract right. In Gulf Atlantic the Dallas court of ap-
peals identified the difference between an action for defamation and an ac-
tion for disparagement. 253 Specifically, the Gulf Atlantic court cited
Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews 254 for the proposition that defamation of a
business is not actionable, although defamation of its owner does give rise to
a claim.255 Furthermore, the court of appeals asserted that disparagement of
a business does constitute a valid cause of action under Texas law.25 6 On
appeal, the Texas Supreme Court supported the court of appeals' contention
that Texas recognizes a cause of action for business disparagement. 257 The
supreme court stated that the elements of this cause of action include: publi-
cation by the defendant, falsity, malice, lack of privilege, and special
damages.258
Gulf Atlantic contended that the one-year statute of limitations for libel
and slander actions barred Hurlbut's business disparagement claim because
the defamatory statements provided the basis for the disparagement ac-
tion.259 Hurlbut stipulated that the statute barred any libel or slander claim,
248. Id. at 368.
249. Id. at 369; see Note, Interference with Prospective Business Relationship: An Old Tort
For The New Marketplace, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 123, 125-35 (1983).
250. See 258 S.W.2d at 369.
251. An argument would be more difficult for a non-competitor to make, however, because
a non-competitor plaintiff would not easily be able to prove a defendant's intent to interfere
with its business.
252. 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987), rev'g on other grounds and remanding 696 S.W.2d 83
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1985).
253. 696 S.W.2d at 96-97.
254. 161 Tex. 284, 289 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1960); see supra notes 232-33 and accompanying
text.
255. 696 S.W.2d at 96.
256. Id. (citing Page v. Layne-Texas Co., 258 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1953, writ dism'd by agr.)).
257. Gulf Atlantic, 762 S.W.2d at 766.
258. Id. (citing J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 697-700 (5th ed. 1977)).
259. 696 S.W.2d at 93. The Texas statute of limitations for libel or slander requires that
plaintiffs commence actions for injuries to their character or reputation by libel or slander
within one year after the cause of action accrues. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5524(i)
(Vernon 1958).
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but contended that it did not bar a disparagement claim. 26° The Gulf Atlan-
tic court of appeals acknowledged that it had to decide whether Hurlbut
actually stated a defamation claim or a disparagement claim.261 In deter-
mining the nature of Hurlbut's claim, the court of appeals examined the
facts alleged in the petition, the evidence presented in support of the allega-
tions, and the type of damages alleged and proved. 262 The court thereby
affirmatively elected to consider the substance of the claim rather than the
designation of the claim in the pleadings as an action for disparagement. 263
To determine whether the statute of limitations for defamation also ap-
plies to disparagement, the Gulf Atlantic court of appeals looked to decisions
from other jurisdictions. The court specifically noted that New York courts
apply the statute of limitations for libel and slander claims to disparagement
actions whenever the statement is personally defamatory as well as damag-
ing to business or property interests.264 The Gulf Atlantic court of appeals,
however, refused to follow the New York rule.265 Instead, the court of ap-
peals held that in determining whether the statute of limitations for libel and
slander applies to disparagement claims, the test is whether the gist of the
tort is an injury to the plaintiff's personal reputation or whether it is a direct
injury to his business or property.266 The two critical factors identified by
the court of appeals include the type of allegations that the plaintiff makes
and the type of damages it seeks.267 Under the court of appeals' test, there-
fore, if the principal complaint is a false accusation of personal misconduct
and the damages alleged and proved primarily are general damages to the
plaintiff's personal reputation, the claim is for libel or slander and falls
under the statute of limitations for such claims. 268 If, however, the principal
complaint is a false statement that directly injures a business or property
interest and the damages alleged and proved seek recovery for specific inju-
ries to the plaintiff's business or property, the claim is for business or prop-
erty disparagement despite the fact that the statements also may have
personally defamed the plaintiff consequentially. 269 Applying this test, the
Gulf Atlantic court of appeals held that Hurlbut's claim constituted a libel or
slander action and, consequently, was barred by the statute of limitations
applicable to libel and slander claims. 270 Upon its review of the Gulf Atlan-
tic court of appeals' decision, the Texas Supreme Court found no reversible
260. 696 S.W.2d at 93.
261. Id. at 93, 97-99.
262. Id. at 97.
263. Id. Otherwise, the court reasoned, defamation plaintiffs could avoid the statute of
limitations simply by alleging that the defamatory statement was a disparagement. Id.
264. Id. (citing Dubourcq v. Brouwer, 124 N.Y.S.2d 67, 72 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 282
A.D. 861, 127 N.Y.S.2d 842, aff'd, 283 A.2d 942, 131 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1953)).
265. 696 S.W.2d at 98.
266. Id. at 98. Under the court of appeals decision in Gulf Atlantic the statute of limita-
tions for defamation applies only to those disparagement actions that are merely incidental to




270. Id. at 98-99.
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error in the court of appeals' conclusion that Hurlbut's claim for business
disparagement essentially constituted a claim for slander. 271 Noting that
Gulf Atlantic's claim amounted in substance to a claim for personal dam-
ages rather than for special damages in the form of pecuniary losses, such as
lost sales, the supreme court accepted the court of appeals' characterization
of the cause of action as an action for slander.272 As a result, the supreme
court also affirmed the court of appeals' determination that the claim was
barred by the statute of limitations for slander actions. 273
Justice Akin, in a dissent to the majority opinion of the court of appeals in
Gulf Atlantic, disagreed with the majority's decision to re-classify the dispar-
agement claim as a claim for libel or slander.2 74 The dissent contended that
the majority ignored the fact that Hurlbut pleaded and proved the elements
of a disparagement claim, submitted special issues to the jury regarding the
disparagement claim, and obtained favorable answers to those issues.275 The
dissent emphasized that plaintiffs may choose the type of claim they wish to
make as long as they present pleadings sufficient to give the opposing attor-
ney notice of the claim asserted. 276 The fact that Hurlbut chose not to make
a claim for defamation should not prevent him from bringing a disparage-
ment action if he could prove the disparagement, the dissent concluded. 277
B. Availability of Federal Statutory Remedies for
Product Disparagement in Texas
In Jetco the Fifth Circuit declined to express an opinion as to whether
Jetco stated a cause of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.278
The Jetco court, however, cited Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Electronic
Products, Inc. ,279 which held that the Lanham Act affords a private cause of
action for product disparagement plaintiffs. 2 0 Nevertheless, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Cranberg indicated that product disparagement plaintiffs could not
sue under the Lanham Act. 28 1 The Cranberg court stated that the Lanham
Act covers only those situations in which a manufacturer makes false state-
ments about its own products.282 Accordingly, the court asserted that
Cranberg's proposed amendment of his complaint to include a claim under
the Lanham Act would be futile.28 3
The Texas courts have not addressed whether a product disparagement
271. Gulf Atlantic, 749 S.W.2d at 766.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 696 S.W.2d at 106.
275. Id.
276. Id. (citing Castelberry v. Gollsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981)); see
TEX. R. Civ. P. 45, 47.
277. GuifAtlantic, 696 S.W.2d at 107.
278. Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 85. For a discussion of the Lanham Act, see supra notes 107-23
and accompanying text.
279. 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965); see supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
280. Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 85.





plaintiff may bring a private cause of action under the FTC Act. It is un-
clear, therefore, whether Texas courts would grant a cause of action under
the FTC Act to noncompetitors. 28 4 Texas courts probably would follow the
general rule, however, that competitors have no such private action under
the FTC Act. 285
C. Injunctive Relief in Texas
Texas follows the rule set forth in Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields that
equity will not enjoin defamation or disparagement. 286 In McMorries v.
Hudson Sales Corp.,287 however, a Texas court of appeals held that equity
would enjoin disparagement only when necessary to protect property inter-
ests threatened by other tortious or illegal acts that used the disparagement
as a means to an unlawful end. 288 The McMorries court held that equity
would not enjoin W.E. McMorries from driving his car that he had covered
with writing disparaging the car. The court reasoned that Hudson failed to
allege that McMorries knew the statements to be false or that McMorries
attempted to interfere with Hudson's business by using statements to intimi-
date or coerce Hudson. 289 Other Texas courts have held that injunctions
may issue if the defendant made the disparaging statements pursuant to, or
in connection with, conspiracy, intimidation, coercion, extortion, or any
criminal act.290 Moreover, Texas courts will enjoin disparagement upon a
showing of breach of trust or of contract. 29 1
In Carter v. Bradshaw292 the court went beyond the distinctions identified
by the Lawrence and McMorries courts and held that injunctions may issue
to restrain disparagement whenever the disparagement is prejudicial to the
party seeking the injunctive relief.293 The Bradshaw court relied on Hawks
v. Yancy 2 9 4 in stating that the rule that equity will not afford injunctive relief
is known by its breach rather than by its observance. 295 The Bradshaw court
284. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
285. See id.
286. Ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920); see supra text accompanying
notes 128-55 (discussing Marlin rule and development of law of equitable relief in disparage-
ment cases); accord Strong v. Biggers, 252 S.W. 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1923, no writ);
Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, Free & Accepted Masons, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 306, 121 S.W. 178, 179-
80 (1909).
287. 233 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1950, no writ).
288. Id. at 941.
289. Id at 941-42; see Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 637 (1937) (court issued
injunction against car owner because he knew statements on his car were false); see also
Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 138 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1940, no writ) (court issued injunction against union because it sought to force Ritter's Cafe to
breach contract with third party by picketing); Gilbralter Sav. & Bldg. Ass'n v. Jobell, 101
S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1937, no writ) (denying injunction because state-
ment was mere libel without other tortious or illegal act involved).
290. Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956, no
writ).
291. Id.
292. 138 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, no writ).
293. Id. at 191.
294. 265 S.W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, no writ).
295. Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, no writ).
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further stated that the traditional rule is a mere fiction and that the personal
rights of individuals are more valuable than property or money.296
The most recent Texas case involving the issuance of injunctions to re-
strain product disparagement is Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc.297
Mowbray sought to enjoin Hajek from publishing or circulating defamatory
statements that were painted on a van he purchased from Mowbray. The
painted statements included several representations of lemons. 298 The Hajek
court relied on Carter v. Knapp Motor Co. 299 and McMorries300 in holding
296. Id. at 191.
297. 647 S.W.2d 253 (1983).
298. The statements printed on Hajek's van included the following: "Jerry Roberts sold
this (representation of a lemon) Disaster (representation of a lemon) at Bill Mowbray Motors
Inc. Help! It's a Dog!" Hajek, 645 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982), rev'd,
647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983).
The court found that Hajek falsely characterized the van as a lemon. Hajek, 645 S.W.2d at
832. Many consumers, however, have purchased automobiles that truly were defective and
that might accurately have been characterized as lemons. See Comment, A New Twist For
Texas "Lemon" Owners, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 155, 155-56 (1985) (consumers have far more
complaints regarding new automobiles than about any other product) [hereinafter Comment,
A New Twist]; see also Pertschuk, Consumer Automobile Problems, 11 U.C.C.L.J. 145, 146
(1978) (FTC statistics indicate considerable consumer dissatisfaction with new cars); Whit-
ford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of The Automobile Warranty, Wis. L.
REV. 1006, 1032 (1968) (Consumer Reports survey revealed that consumer's most common
complaints related to dealers' failure to cooperate and dealers' inability to successfully repair
cars). The Texas legislature passed a statute in 1983 to provide a remedy for consumers who
purchase defective automobiles, or "lemons." TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(367),
§ 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985). Most states also have passed lemon laws setting forth warranty
performance obligations. Hannigan, The New "Lemon Laws": Expanding UC.C. Remedies,
17 U.C.C.L.J. 116, 118-19 (1984); Goldberg, New Mexico's "Lemon Law": Consumer Protec-
tion or Consumer Frustration?, 16 NEW MEX. L. REV. 251 (1986); Comment, A New Twist,
supra, at 156; Note, Nebraska's "Lemon Law": Synthesizing Remedies for the Owner of a
"Lemon," 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 345, 372-73 (1984); see Comment, Squeezing Consumers:
Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589 (1985);
Comment, Remedies Available to The Purchaser of a Defective Used Car, 47 MoNT. L. REV.
273 (1986); Comment, Virginia's Lemon Law: The Best Treatment For Car Owners, 19 U.
RICH. L. REV. 405 (1984); Comment, Retail Sellers and The Enforcement of Manufacturer
Warranties: An Application of The UCC to Consumer Product Distribution Systems, 32
WAYNE L. REV. 1049 (1986). The Texas legislature wanted to provide a clearly defined cause
of action against the manufacturer through an inexpensive, accessible dispute resolution sys-
tem. See Comment, A New Twist, supra, at 165-66. The Texas lemon law requires that a
consumer submit to the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission for a hearing on the merits as a
prerequisite to the consumer's use of the lemon presumption. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Texas is the only state that requires a formal admin-
istrative hearing. See Comment, A New Twist supra, at 157, 166. Other states provide for
informal dispute resolution. Id at 157, n.12.
Generally, the lemon law provides that a consumer has a direct cause of action against the
automobile manufacturer for replacement of the lemon or a refund of the purchase price when
the vehicle does not conform to its express warranty after a reasonable number of attempts at
repair. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The statute
specifically provides that if a new car does not conform to the manufacturer's express warran-
ties and the car owner reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer or dealer within the
prescribed time period, the manufacturer or dealer must make any necessary repairs to con-
form the vehicle to the warranty. Id A reasonable number of attempts to repair are presumed
to have been made when the same defect is subject to unsuccessful repair for at least four times
or when the car has been out of service for repair for at least thirty days during the prescribed
time period. Id.; see Comment, A New Twist, supra, at 168-89.
299. 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943); see supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
300. Menard v. Haule, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E. 2d 436 (1937); Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v.
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that an injunction could issue to restrain Hajek's disparagement of Mow-
bray. 301 The lower court emphasized that Mowbray's property interests
were at risk and that Hajek exhibited a coercive intent.302 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the constitutional guaranty of free
speech and press prohibited the issuance of injunctions to restrain defama-
tion or disparagement. 30 3
D. Defenses in Texas
Section 73.005 of the Code provides that truth is a defense to defamation
actions. 3°4 The statute further provides that defenses existing at common
law or pursuant to statutes shall continue to be effective. 30 5 Defenses ex-
isting prior to or outside of the libel statute, therefore, apply to disparage-
ment actions whether they are brought under the statute or at common law.
These defenses include truth, common law privilege, and constitutional
privilege.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS To THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
A. Recognize that the Texas Libel Statute does not Preclude Common
Law Product Disparagement Liability
The logic of the Jetco decision is flawed. The court failed to recognize that
although the Texas libel statute may govern all libel actions and may offer a
complete definition of libel, the libel statute does not necessarily govern dis-
paragement actions. Libel actions are claims for injurious falsehoods that
harm the interests of the plaintiff as a person.30 6 The fact that the Texas
legislature chose to provide a statutory cause of action for libel, therefore,
does not necessarily indicate that the legislature intended to eliminate com-
mon law disparagement actions. The obvious intent of the legislature in en-
acting the libel statute was to afford libel plaintiffs a simple remedy and to
accommodate and protect libel plaintiffs. The legislature did not intend to
eliminate all remedies that are not within the statute and thereby to increase
Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). An injunction is proper to
protect natural and contractual rights from interference by verbal or written threats. McMor-
ries, 233 S.W.2d at 940-42; see Lloyd & KDFW-TV v. Alaska Worldwide, Inc., 550 S.W.2d
343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance &
Bartenders Int'l League of Am. v. Longley, 160 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942,
no writ).
301. Hajek, 645 S.W.2d at 834. But see Lawrence v. Atwood, 295 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956, no writ) (equity will not enjoin defendant's display of sign that
disparaged home builder's houses through words and painting of lemons).
302. 645 S.W.2d at 834.
303. 647 S.W.2d at 255. The court relied on article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section 8 provides that every person shall be at liberty to speak, write,
or publish his opinions on any subject, but that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that
privilege, and that no law shall ever curtail the liberty of speech or of the press. Id. The Hajek
court also relied on Ex Parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (1920) (equity will not
intervene to restrain constitutionally guaranteed free speech or press).
304. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.005 (Vernon 1986).
305. Id. § 73.006.
306. See supra notes 1-2 and 8-16 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs' burdens. The Texas Supreme Court, therefore, should recognize
that the state libel statute does not preclude product disparagement claims.
B. Do Not Apply the Statute of Limitations for Libel and Slander Actions
to Product Disparagement Claims
Just as the libel statute should not govern disparagement actions, the stat-
ute of limitations applicable to statutory libel and slander claims should not
apply to common law disparagement claims. The statute of limitations ap-
propirately applies to statutory defamation actions because the statutory
remedy allows plaintiffs to recover without making any special showings.
The statute of limitations for defamation restores the balance between the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants in defamation actions. Applying the
statute of limitations to common law disparagement actions, however, would
destroy that balance by limiting the availability of remedies for which plain-
tiffs must make special showings. The statute of limitations would afford too
much protection to product disparagement defendants, who already are pro-
tected by the requirements that product disparagement plaintiffs make spe-
cial showings and bear the burden of proof of those showings.30 7
307. A California appeals court recently examined the issue of whether to apply the state's
one-year statute of limitations for libel and slander to actions for product disparagement or
trade libel. In Guess, Inc. v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 474, 222 Cal. Rptr. 79, 83
(1986), the court held that the one-year libel and slander statute of limitations did not apply to
trade libel claims. Instead, the Guess court applied the two-year statute of limitations that
governs actions on contracts and on other obligations or liabilities. Id. The court relied upon
the distinction made by PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128, and consistent with the
California courts' decisions, between defamation and disparagement. Id. at 82-83; see supra
note 2. The court emphasized that the nature of the right sued upon in product disparagement
claims is proprietary, not personal. 222 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (citing Richardson v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 12, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981); Edwards v. Fresno Community Hosp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 702, 704, 113 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1974)). In product disparagement actions, the
defendant has directed his false statement at the plaintiff's goods, rather than at the plaintiff's
personal reputation. Id. (citing Idaho Norland Corp. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 509 F. Supp.
1070 (D. Colo. 1981); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 128)).
In Idaho Norland Corp. v. Caelter Indus., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 1070, 1071 (D. Colo. 1981),
the court noted that among the jurisdictions that have considered what statute of limitations to
apply to claims for product disparagement or trade libel, the authorities are split. The Idaho
Norland court stated that a small majority of state courts have applied the libel and slander
statute of limitations to trade libel and business disparagement claims. Id. (citing Gee v. Pima
County, 126 Ariz. 116, 612 P.2d 1079 (1980); Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Indus., 68 So. 2d
180 (Fla. 1953); Norton v. Kanouff, 165 Neb. 435, 86 N.W.2d 72 (1957); Buehrer v. Provident
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931); Woodward v. Pacific Fruit & Pro-
duce Co., 165 Or. 250, 106 P.2d 1043 (1940)). The court further noted that three federal
district courts also have applied the libel and slander statute of limitations to disparagement
actions. Id. (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 343 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Lehigh Chem. Co. v. Celanese Corp.. of America, 278 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1968);
Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 20 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)). Four states, including
Texas, however, have refused to apply the libel and slander statute of limitations to disparage-
ment claims. Id. (citing King v. Miller, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S.E. 302 (1926); Reliable Mfg.
Co. v. Vaughn Novelty Mfg. Co., 294 Ill. App. 601, 13 N.E.2d 518 (1938) (abstract opin.)); see
also Lase Co. v. Wein Prods., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Vaccaro Constr. Co. v.
A.J. Depace, Inc., 137 N.J. Super. 512, 349 A.2d 570 (1975); Brown v. Freehold Land Mort-
gage Co., 97 Tex. 599, 80 S.W. 985 (1904) (malicious interference with business with intent to




C. Distinguish Between the Libel Requirements of Personal Defamation
and the Libel Remedy of Recovering Financial Losses
Another defect in the Jetco court's reasoning further undermines its hold-
ing that Texas courts do not recognize actions for product disparagement.
The Jetco court mistakenly determined that because the statements, if false,
would injure the reputation of Jetco and its owner by subjecting them to
financial injury, the claim properly fell within the libel statute.308 The stat-
ute permits recovery of financial losses only when the false statement injures
a person's reputation and thereby causes such financial losses. 309 The per-
sonal defamation, or injury to personal reputation, is an element of the ac-
tion and a prerequisite to recovery of any damages. 310 The Jetco court
recognized this requirement and discussed the fact that the statute affords no
cause of action or libel for a business. 311 The court cited Newspapers, Inc. v.
Matthews312 for the proposition that the statement must defame the owner of
a business, whether the owner is an individual or a corporation, 31 3 in order
for the plaintiff to recover either nonfinancial or financial damages. 314 The
Jetco court, however, failed to apply the requirement that in libel actions,
financial injury must be a result of an injury to reputation. On the contrary,
the court permitted recovery for libel when the injury to reputation results
from the financial loss. 315
D. Do Not Construe Product Disparagement Actions that also Involve
Defamation as Actions for Defamation
The court of appeals in Gulf Atlantic mistakenly held that a court must
determine at the outset whether a complaint states a claim for disparage-
ment or defamation. 316 Furthermore, the court of appeals erroneously con-
cluded that if the claim primarily involves defamation, the court must rule
only on that cause of action, and that if the plaintiff is unable to prove defa-
mation, he may not recover for disparagement. 31 7
Justice Akin's dissent to the majority opinion of the court of appeals in
Gulf Atlantic pointed out the obvious flaw in the majority's logic. 318 It is
illogical to conclude that a product disparagement plaintiff who sufficiently
pleads and proves his claim may not recover for disparagement if the facts of
308. See Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84.
309. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986).
310. Id.
311. Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 85.
312. 161 Tex. 284, 339 S.W.2d 890 (1960).
313. See De Mankauski v. Ship Channel Dev. Co., 300 S.W. 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galves-
ton 1927, no writ).
314. Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 85 (citing Matthews, 339 S.W.2d at 893).
315. Id. at 84. In a product disparagement action, the defamation of the plaintiff is merely
incidental to the disparagement of the product. Royer v. Stoody Co., 192 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.
Okla. 1961). For a discussion of the elements for defamation and disparagement, see supra
note 8 and text accompanying note 37.
316. Gulf Atlantic, 696 S.W.2d at 97-99.
317. Id. at 98.
318. Id. at 106 (Akin, J., dissenting).
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the case indicate that the primary injury was defamation and the plaintiff is
unable to recover for defamation because of insufficient proof or because of a
bar on the claim by the statute of limitation. As Justice Akin noted, the
plaintiffs have the responsibility and the freedom to assert whatever claim
entitles them to relief.31 9 It is not the court's duty to choose what theory the
plaintiffs may argue. 320 Indeed, courts may not limit the plaintiffs to one
theory of recovery. 321 Upon its review of Gulf Atlantic, the Texas Supreme
Court should have reversed the court of appeals' decision on this ground and
adopted Justice Akin's dissenting opinion. Instead, the supreme court mis-
takenly agreed with the resolution of this question proposed by the
majority. 322
E. Recognize the Common Law Tort of Product Disparagement as
Distinct from Slander of Title of Property
In decisions such as Russell v. Campbell32 3 and Ward v. Gee324 Texas
courts have recognized a cause of action for slander of property. 325 The
slander of property action covers claims for slander of the quality of goods
or property as well as for slander of title to real and personal property.3 26
Because product disparagement is virtually identical to slander of the quality
of goods, Texas courts should recognize a cause of action for product dispar-
agement as distinct from slander of property. Even the Jetco trial court
opinion, which refused to recognize a claim stated as one for product dispar-
agement, recognized that a product disparagement plaintiff could recover for
slander of property. 327 It seems illogical to permit recovery when the com-
plaint characterizes the claim as one for slander of property, but to refuse to
recognize claims characterized as actions for product disparagement, partic-
ularly since the elements of the two actions are identical. The seemingly
arbitrary distinction between the two claims and the Texas courts' refusal to
recognize claims stated in terms of trade libel or product disparagement are
contrary to the underlying purpose of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,3 28
which free the plaintiff from pleading a specific cause of action. 329 Texas
courts, therefore, should recognize actions that are pleaded and proven as
product disparagement claims.
319. Id. at 107.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Gulf Atlantic, 749 S.W.2d at 766-67.
323. 725 S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
324. Ward v. Gee, 61 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ ref'd).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 217-20.
326. For a discussion of the elements of an action for slander of property, see supra notes
217-20 and accompanying text.
327. Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84.
328. Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only make a short and plain
statement of his claim showing that he is entitled to relief. TEX. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose
of the rule is to facilitate a decision on the merits, rather than on the characterization of the
cause of action in the pleadings. See Conely v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (discussing this
purpose with respect to federal pleading).
329. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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F Recognize Product Disparagement Claims as Distinct From Business
Disparagement Actions
In Page v. Layne-Texas Co. 330 the court recognized that a plaintiff has a
cause of action for business disparagement under Texas law if the defendant
intended to interfere with the plaintiff's business despite the fact that the
interference did not constitute statutory libel.33' In Gulf Atlantic Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Hurlbut332 the Dallas court of appeals upheld the rule that dis-
paragement of a business is actionable. 333 Product disparagement claims,
therefore, also should be actionable under Texas law because they are a form
of intentional interference with business relationships. 334
IV. CONCLUSION
No court has clearly recognized a cause of action for product disparage-
ment under Texas law.335 Although Texas courts recognize claims for slan-
der of property and business disparagement, 336 Texas state courts and
federal courts interpreting Texas law have refused to permit recovery for
product disparagement. The Texas Supreme Court should acknowledge the
distinction between defamation and disparagement actions. Accordingly,
the court should permit recovery for common law product disparagement
claims that do not constitute libel or slander within the definition of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.337 The court should recognize
that the libel statute does not preclude recovery for common law product
disparagement. Furthermore, product disparagement plaintiffs should have
a cause of action under Texas law regardless of whether their cases also
involve elements of defamation. The Texas Supreme Court should adopt the
rationale of Justice Akin's dissent to the court of appeals' decision in Gulf
Atlantic338 and apply that rationale to the tort of product disparagement, as
Justice Akin applied it to business disparagement. Justice Akin's approach
would permit plaintiffs to choose whether they seek to recover for defama-
tion, disparagement, or both. In the event the Texas Supreme Court chooses
not to recognize a separate cause of action for product disparagement, the
court should recognize that product disparagement is an actionable form of
interference with business relationships under Page.339 Moreover, the court
should accept the theory that product disparagement is a derivation of slan-
330. 258 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ dism'd by agr.).
331. Id. at 369..
332. 696 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 749
S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1987).
333. 696 S.W.2d at 96 (citing Page, 258 S.W.2d at 369).
334. For a discussion of product disparagement as a form of tortious interference with
economic relationships rather than as a form of defamation, see supra notes 2 and 9.
335. See Cranberg, 756 F.2d at 389 (uncertain whether Texas recognizes cause of action for
product disparagement or trade libel).
336. See Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84 (recognizing cause of action for slander of title); Gulf
Atlantic, 696 S.W.2d at 96 (recognizing cause of action for business disparagement).
337. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986).
338. Gulf Atlantic, 696 S.W.2d at 369.
339. 258 S.W.2d at 369.
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der of property, for which Texas courts have consistently permitted recov-
ery. 340 In evaluating its position on product disparagement liability in
Texas, the Texas Supreme Court should consider that without a remedy for
product disparagement, manufacturers and sellers will continue to suffer fi-
nancial injury whenever others falsely disparage their products without per-
sonally defaming the owners of the business.
340. See Jetco, 325 F. Supp. at 84.
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